Dopamine dysregulation syndrome (DDS) is a dysfunction of the reward system observed in some individuals taking dopaminergic medications for an extended length of time.
It typically occurs in people with Parkinson’s disease (PD) who have taken dopamine agonist medications for an extended period of time. It is characterised by self-control problems such as addiction to medication, gambling, or sexual behaviour.
PD was first formally described in 1817; however, L-dopa did not enter clinical practice until almost 1970. In these initial works there were already reports of neuropsychiatric complications. During the following decades cases featuring DDS symptoms in relation to dopamine therapy such as hypersexuality, gambling or punding (compulsive performance of repetitive task, such as assembling and disassembling. collecting, or sorting household objects), appeared. DDS was first described as a syndrome in the year 2000. Three years later the first review articles on the syndrome were written, showing an increasing awareness of the DDS importance. Diagnostic criteria were proposed in 2005.
Epidemiology
DDS is not common among PD patients. Prevalence may be around 4%. Its prevalence is higher among males with an early onset of the disease. Previous substance abuse such as heavy drinking or drug intake seems to be the main risk factor along with a history of affective disorder.
Signs and Symptoms
The most common symptom is craving for dopaminergic medication. However other behavioural symptoms can appear independently of craving or co-occur with it. Craving is an intense impulse of the subject to obtain medication even in the absence of symptoms that indicate its intake. To fulfil this need the person will self-administer extra doses. When self-administration is not possible, aggressive outbursts or the use of strategies such as symptom simulation or bribery to access additional medication can also appear.
Hypomania, manifesting with feelings of euphoria, omnipotence, or grandiosity, are prone to appear in those moments when medication effects are maximum; dysphoria, characterised by sadness, psychomotor slowing, fatigue or apathy are typical with dopamine replacement therapy (DRT) withdrawal. Different impulse control disorders have been described including gambling, compulsive shopping, eating disorders and hypersexuality. Behavioural disturbances, most commonly aggressive tendencies, are the norm. Psychosis is also common.
Causes
Parkinson’s disease is a common neurological disorder characterized by a degeneration of dopamine neurons in the substantia nigra and a loss of dopamine in the putamen. It is described as a motor disease, but it also produces cognitive and behavioural symptoms. The most common treatment is dopamine replacement therapy, which consists in the administration of levodopa (L-Dopa) or dopamine agonists (such as pramipexole or ropinirole) to patients. Dopamine replacement therapy is well known to improve motor symptoms but its effects in cognitive and behavioural symptoms are more complex. Dopamine has been related to the normal learning of stimuli with behavioural and motivational significance, attention, and most importantly the reward system. In accordance with the role of dopamine in reward processing, addictive drugs stimulate dopamine release. Although the exact mechanism has yet to be elucidated, the role of dopamine in the reward system and addiction has been proposed as the origin of DDS.
Models of addiction have been used to explain how dopamine replacement therapy produces DDS. One of these models of addiction proposes that over the usage course of a drug there is a habituation to the rewarding effects that it produces at the initial stages. This habituation is thought to be dopamine mediated. With long-term administration of L-dopa the reward system gets used to it and needs higher quantities. As the user increases drug intake there is a loss of dopaminergic receptors in the striatum which acts in addition to an impairment in goal-direction mental functions to produce an enhancement of sensitization to dopamine therapy. The behavioural and mood symptoms of the syndrome are produced by the dopamine overdose.
Diagnosis
Diagnosis of the syndrome is clinical since there are no laboratory tests to confirm it. For diagnosis a person with documented responsiveness to medication has to increase medication intake beyond dosage needed to relieve their parkinsonian symptoms in a pathological addiction-like pattern. A current mood disorder (depression, anxiety, hypomanic state or euphoria), behavioural disorder (excessive gambling, shopping or sexual tendency, aggression, or social isolation) or an altered perception about the effect of medication also have to be present. A questionnaire on the typical symptoms of DDS has also been developed and can help in the diagnosis process.
Prevention
The main prevention measure proposed is the prescription of the lowest possible dose of dopamine replacement therapy to individuals at risk. The minimisation of the use of dopamine agonists, and of short duration formulations of L-Dopa can also decrease risk of the syndrome.
Management
First choice management measure consists in the enforcement of a dopaminergic drug dosage reduction. If this decrease is maintained, dysregulation syndrome features soon decrease. Cessation of dopamine agonists therapy may also be of use. Some behavioural characteristics may respond to psychotherapy; and social support is important to control risk factors. In some cases antipsychotic drugs may also be of use in the presence of psychosis, aggression, gambling or hypersexuality.
Based upon five case reports, valproic acid may have efficacy in controlling the symptoms of levodopa-induced DDS that arise from the use of levodopa for the treatment of Parkinson’s disease.
Dopamine, sold under the brandname Intropin among others, is a medication most commonly used in the treatment of very low blood pressure, a slow heart rate that is causing symptoms, and, if epinephrine is not available, cardiac arrest. In newborn babies it continues to be the preferred treatment for very low blood pressure. In children epinephrine or norepinephrine is generally preferred while in adults norepinephrine is generally preferred for very low blood pressure. It is given intravenously or intraosseously as a continuous infusion. Effects typically begin within five minutes. Doses are then increased to effect.
Common side effects include worsening kidney function, an irregular heartbeat, chest pain, vomiting, headache, or anxiety. If it enters into the soft tissue around the vein local tissue death may occur. The medication phentolamine can be given to try to decrease this risk. It is unclear if dopamine is safe to use during pregnancy or breastfeeding. At low doses dopamine mainly triggers dopamine receptors and β1-adrenergic receptors while at high doses it works via α-adrenergic receptors.
Dopamine was first synthesized in a laboratory in 1910 by George Barger and James Ewens in England. It is on the World Health Organisation’s List of Essential Medicines. In human physiology dopamine is a neurotransmitter as well as a hormone.
In newborn babies it continues to be the preferred treatment for very low blood pressure. In children epinephrine or norepinephrine is generally preferred while in adults norepinephrine is generally preferred for very low blood pressure.
In those with low blood volume or septic shock, this should be corrected with intravenous fluids before dopamine is considered.
Kidney Function
Low-dosage dopamine has been routinely used for the treatment and prevention of acute kidney injury. However, since 1999 a number of reviews have concluded that doses at such low levels are not effective and may sometimes be harmful.
Administration
Since the half-life of dopamine in plasma is short – approximately one minute in adults, two minutes in newborn babies and up to five minutes in preterm babies – it is usually given as a continuous intravenous drip rather than a single injection.
Other
A fluorinated form of L-DOPA known as fluorodopa is available for use in positron emission tomography to assess the function of the nigrostriatal pathway.
Contraindications
Dopamine should generally not be given to people who have a pheochromocytoma or uncorrected very fast heart rate.
Side Effects
The LD50, or dose which is expected to prove lethal in 50% of the population, has been found to be: 59 mg/kg (mouse; administered intravenously); 950 mg/kg (mouse; administered intraperitoneally); 163 mg/kg (rat; administered intraperitoneally); 79 mg/kg (dog; administered intravenously).
Extravasation
If extravasation occurs local tissue death may result. The medication phentolamine can be injected at the site to try to decrease the risk of tissue death.
Mechanism of Action
Its effects, depending on dosage, include an increase in sodium excretion by the kidneys, an increase in urine output, an increase in heart rate, and an increase in blood pressure. At low doses it acts through the sympathetic nervous system to increase heart muscle contraction force and heart rate, thereby increasing cardiac output and blood pressure. Higher doses also cause vasoconstriction that further increases blood pressure.
While some effects result from stimulation of dopamine receptors, the prominent cardiovascular effects result from dopamine acting at α1, β1, and β2 adrenergic receptors.
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Dopamine (DA, a contraction of 3,4-dihydroxyphenethylamine) is a neuromodulatory molecule that plays several important roles in cells. It is an organic chemical of the catecholamine and phenethylamine families. Dopamine constitutes about 80% of the catecholamine content in the brain. It is an amine synthesized by removing a carboxyl group from a molecule of its precursor chemical, L-DOPA, which is synthesized in the brain and kidneys. Dopamine is also synthesized in plants and most animals. In the brain, dopamine functions as a neurotransmitter – a chemical released by neurons (nerve cells) to send signals to other nerve cells. Neurotransmitters are synthesized in specific regions of the brain, but affect many regions systemically. The brain includes several distinct dopamine pathways, one of which plays a major role in the motivational component of reward-motivated behaviour. The anticipation of most types of rewards increases the level of dopamine in the brain, and many addictive drugs increase dopamine release or block its reuptake into neurons following release. Other brain dopamine pathways are involved in motor control and in controlling the release of various hormones. These pathways and cell groups form a dopamine system which is neuromodulatory.
In popular culture and media, dopamine is often portrayed as the main chemical of pleasure, but the current opinion in pharmacology is that dopamine instead confers motivational salience; in other words, dopamine signals the perceived motivational prominence (i.e. the desirability or aversiveness) of an outcome, which in turn propels the organism’s behaviour toward or away from achieving that outcome. It is the endocannabinoid, 2-Arachidonoylglycerol (2-AG: C23H38O4; 20:4, ω-6) that shape accumbal encoding of cue-motivated behaviour via CB1 receptor activation in the ventral tegmentum, and thereby modulates cue-evoked dopamine transients during the pursuit of reward.
Outside the central nervous system, dopamine functions primarily as a local paracrine messenger. In blood vessels, it inhibits norepinephrine release and acts as a vasodilator (at normal concentrations); in the kidneys, it increases sodium excretion and urine output; in the pancreas, it reduces insulin production; in the digestive system, it reduces gastrointestinal motility and protects intestinal mucosa; and in the immune system, it reduces the activity of lymphocytes. With the exception of the blood vessels, dopamine in each of these peripheral systems is synthesized locally and exerts its effects near the cells that release it.
Several important diseases of the nervous system are associated with dysfunctions of the dopamine system, and some of the key medications used to treat them work by altering the effects of dopamine. Parkinson’s disease, a degenerative condition causing tremor and motor impairment, is caused by a loss of dopamine-secreting neurons in an area of the midbrain called the substantia nigra. Its metabolic precursor L-DOPA can be manufactured; Levodopa, a pure form of L-DOPA, is the most widely used treatment for Parkinson’s. There is evidence that schizophrenia involves altered levels of dopamine activity, and most antipsychotic drugs used to treat this are dopamine antagonists which reduce dopamine activity. Similar dopamine antagonist drugs are also some of the most effective anti-nausea agents. Restless legs syndrome and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are associated with decreased dopamine activity. Dopaminergic stimulants can be addictive in high doses, but some are used at lower doses to treat ADHD. Dopamine itself is available as a manufactured medication for intravenous injection: although it cannot reach the brain from the bloodstream, its peripheral effects make it useful in the treatment of heart failure or shock, especially in newborn babies.
Dopamine was first synthesized in 1910 by George Barger and James Ewens at Wellcome Laboratories in London, England, and first identified in the human brain by Katharine Montagu in 1957. It was named dopamine because it is a monoamine whose precursor in the Barger-Ewens synthesis is 3,4-dihydroxyphenylalanine (levodopa or L-DOPA). Dopamine’s function as a neurotransmitter was first recognised in 1958 by Arvid Carlsson and Nils-Åke Hillarp at the Laboratory for Chemical Pharmacology of the National Heart Institute of Sweden. Carlsson was awarded the 2000 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for showing that dopamine is not only a precursor of norepinephrine (noradrenaline) and epinephrine (adrenaline), but is also itself a neurotransmitter.
Polydopamine
Research motivated by adhesive polyphenolic proteins in mussels led to the discovery in 2007 that a wide variety of materials, if placed in a solution of dopamine at slightly basic pH, will become coated with a layer of polymerised dopamine, often referred to as polydopamine. This polymerised dopamine forms by a spontaneous oxidation reaction, and is formally a type of melanin. Furthermore, dopamine self-polymerisation can be used to modulate the mechanical properties of peptide-based gels. Synthesis of polydopamine usually involves reaction of dopamine hydrochloride with Tris as a base in water. The structure of polydopamine is unknown.
Polydopamine coatings can form on objects ranging in size from nanoparticles to large surfaces. Polydopamine layers have chemical properties that have the potential to be extremely useful, and numerous studies have examined their possible applications. At the simplest level, they can be used for protection against damage by light, or to form capsules for drug delivery. At a more sophisticated level, their adhesive properties may make them useful as substrates for biosensors or other biologically active macromolecules.
Structure
A dopamine molecule consists of a catechol structure (a benzene ring with two hydroxyl side groups) with one amine group attached via an ethyl chain. As such, dopamine is the simplest possible catecholamine, a family that also includes the neurotransmitters norepinephrine and epinephrine. The presence of a benzene ring with this amine attachment makes it a substituted phenethylamine, a family that includes numerous psychoactive drugs.
Like most amines, dopamine is an organic base. As a base, it is generally protonated in acidic environments (in an acid-base reaction). The protonated form is highly water-soluble and relatively stable, but can become oxidised if exposed to oxygen or other oxidants. In basic environments, dopamine is not protonated. In this free base form, it is less water-soluble and also more highly reactive. Because of the increased stability and water-solubility of the protonated form, dopamine is supplied for chemical or pharmaceutical use as dopamine hydrochloride—that is, the hydrochloride salt that is created when dopamine is combined with hydrochloric acid. In dry form, dopamine hydrochloride is a fine powder which is white to yellow in colour.
Biochemistry
Synthesis
Dopamine is synthesized in a restricted set of cell types, mainly neurons and cells in the medulla of the adrenal glands. The primary and minor metabolic pathways respectively are:
The direct precursor of dopamine, L-DOPA, can be synthesized indirectly from the essential amino acid phenylalanine or directly from the non-essential amino acid tyrosine. These amino acids are found in nearly every protein and so are readily available in food, with tyrosine being the most common. Although dopamine is also found in many types of food, it is incapable of crossing the blood–brain barrier that surrounds and protects the brain. It must therefore be synthesized inside the brain to perform its neuronal activity.
L-Phenylalanine is converted into L-tyrosine by the enzyme phenylalanine hydroxylase, with molecular oxygen (O2) and tetrahydrobiopterin as cofactors. L-Tyrosine is converted into L-DOPA by the enzyme tyrosine hydroxylase, with tetrahydrobiopterin, O2, and iron (Fe2+) as cofactors. L-DOPA is converted into dopamine by the enzyme aromatic L-amino acid decarboxylase (also known as DOPA decarboxylase), with pyridoxal phosphate as the cofactor.
Dopamine itself is used as precursor in the synthesis of the neurotransmitters norepinephrine and epinephrine. Dopamine is converted into norepinephrine by the enzyme dopamine β-hydroxylase, with O2 and L-ascorbic acid as cofactors. Norepinephrine is converted into epinephrine by the enzyme phenylethanolamine N-methyltransferase with S-adenosyl-L-methionine as the cofactor.
Some of the cofactors also require their own synthesis. Deficiency in any required amino acid or cofactor can impair the synthesis of dopamine, norepinephrine, and epinephrine.
Degradation
Dopamine is broken down into inactive metabolites by a set of enzymes—monoamine oxidase (MAO), catechol-O-methyl transferase (COMT), and aldehyde dehydrogenase (ALDH), acting in sequence. Both isoforms of monoamine oxidase, MAO-A and MAO-B, effectively metabolise dopamine. Different breakdown pathways exist but the main end-product is homovanillic acid (HVA), which has no known biological activity. From the bloodstream, homovanillic acid is filtered out by the kidneys and then excreted in the urine. The two primary metabolic routes that convert dopamine into HVA are:
Dopamine → DOPAL → DOPAC → HVA – catalyzed by MAO, ALDH, and COMT respectively
Dopamine → 3-Methoxytyramine → HVA – catalyzed by COMT and MAO+ALDH respectively
In clinical research on schizophrenia, measurements of homovanillic acid in plasma have been used to estimate levels of dopamine activity in the brain. A difficulty in this approach however, is separating the high level of plasma homovanillic acid contributed by the metabolism of norepinephrine.
Although dopamine is normally broken down by an oxidoreductase enzyme, it is also susceptible to oxidation by direct reaction with oxygen, yielding quinones plus various free radicals as products. The rate of oxidation can be increased by the presence of ferric iron or other factors. Quinones and free radicals produced by autoxidation of dopamine can poison cells, and there is evidence that this mechanism may contribute to the cell loss that occurs in Parkinson’s disease and other conditions.
Functions
Cellular Effects
Refer to Dopamine Receptor.
Dopamine exerts its effects by binding to and activating cell surface receptors. In humans, dopamine has a high binding affinity at dopamine receptors and human trace amine-associated receptor 1 (hTAAR1). In mammals, five subtypes of dopamine receptors have been identified, labelled from D1 to D5. All of them function as metabotropic, G protein-coupled receptors, meaning that they exert their effects via a complex second messenger system. These receptors can be divided into two families, known as D1-like and D2-like. For receptors located on neurons in the nervous system, the ultimate effect of D1-like activation (D1 and D5) can be excitation (via opening of sodium channels) or inhibition (via opening of potassium channels); the ultimate effect of D2-like activation (D2, D3, and D4) is usually inhibition of the target neuron. Consequently, it is incorrect to describe dopamine itself as either excitatory or inhibitory: its effect on a target neuron depends on which types of receptors are present on the membrane of that neuron and on the internal responses of that neuron to the second messenger cAMP. D1 receptors are the most numerous dopamine receptors in the human nervous system; D2 receptors are next; D3, D4, and D5 receptors are present at significantly lower levels.
Storage, Release, and Reuptake
Inside the brain, dopamine functions as a neurotransmitter and neuromodulator, and is controlled by a set of mechanisms common to all monoamine neurotransmitters. After synthesis, dopamine is transported from the cytosol into synaptic vesicles by a solute carrier—a vesicular monoamine transporter, VMAT2. Dopamine is stored in these vesicles until it is ejected into the synaptic cleft. In most cases, the release of dopamine occurs through a process called exocytosis which is caused by action potentials, but it can also be caused by the activity of an intracellular trace amine-associated receptor, TAAR1. TAAR1 is a high-affinity receptor for dopamine, trace amines, and certain substituted amphetamines that is located along membranes in the intracellular milieu of the presynaptic cell; activation of the receptor can regulate dopamine signalling by inducing dopamine reuptake inhibition and efflux as well as by inhibiting neuronal firing through a diverse set of mechanisms.
Once in the synapse, dopamine binds to and activates dopamine receptors. These can be postsynaptic dopamine receptors, which are located on dendrites (the postsynaptic neuron), or presynaptic autoreceptors (e.g. the D2sh and presynaptic D3 receptors), which are located on the membrane of an axon terminal (the presynaptic neuron). After the postsynaptic neuron elicits an action potential, dopamine molecules quickly become unbound from their receptors. They are then absorbed back into the presynaptic cell, via reuptake mediated either by the dopamine transporter or by the plasma membrane monoamine transporter. Once back in the cytosol, dopamine can either be broken down by a monoamine oxidase or repackaged into vesicles by VMAT2, making it available for future release.
In the brain the level of extracellular dopamine is modulated by two mechanisms: phasic and tonic transmission. Phasic dopamine release, like most neurotransmitter release in the nervous system, is driven directly by action potentials in the dopamine-containing cells. Tonic dopamine transmission occurs when small amounts of dopamine are released without being preceded by presynaptic action potentials. Tonic transmission is regulated by a variety of factors, including the activity of other neurons and neurotransmitter reuptake.
Central Nervous System
Inside the brain, dopamine plays important roles in executive functions, motor control, motivation, arousal, reinforcement, and reward, as well as lower-level functions including lactation, sexual gratification, and nausea. The dopaminergic cell groups and pathways make up the dopamine system which is neuromodulatory.
Dopaminergic neurons (dopamine-producing nerve cells) are comparatively few in number—a total of around 400,000 in the human brain – and their cell bodies are confined in groups to a few relatively small brain areas. However their axons project to many other brain areas, and they exert powerful effects on their targets. These dopaminergic cell groups were first mapped in 1964 by Annica Dahlström and Kjell Fuxe, who assigned them labels starting with the letter “A” (for “aminergic”). In their scheme, areas A1 through A7 contain the neurotransmitter norepinephrine, whereas A8 through A14 contain dopamine. The dopaminergic areas they identified are:
The substantia nigra (groups 8 and 9);
The ventral tegmental area (group 10);
The posterior hypothalamus (group 11);
The arcuate nucleus (group 12);
The zona incerta (group 13); and
The periventricular nucleus (group 14).
The substantia nigra is a small midbrain area that forms a component of the basal ganglia. This has two parts—an input area called the pars compacta and an output area the pars reticulata. The dopaminergic neurons are found mainly in the pars compacta (cell group A8) and nearby (group A9). In humans, the projection of dopaminergic neurons from the substantia nigra pars compacta to the dorsal striatum, termed the nigrostriatal pathway, plays a significant role in the control of motor function and in learning new motor skills. These neurons are especially vulnerable to damage, and when a large number of them die, the result is a parkinsonian syndrome.
The ventral tegmental area (VTA) is another midbrain area. The most prominent group of VTA dopaminergic neurons projects to the prefrontal cortex via the mesocortical pathway and another smaller group projects to the nucleus accumbens via the mesolimbic pathway. Together, these two pathways are collectively termed the mesocorticolimbic projection. The VTA also sends dopaminergic projections to the amygdala, cingulate gyrus, hippocampus, and olfactory bulb. Mesocorticolimbic neurons play a central role in reward and other aspects of motivation.[41] Accumulating literature shows that dopamine also plays a crucial role in aversive learning through its effects on a number of brain regions.
The posterior hypothalamus has dopamine neurons that project to the spinal cord, but their function is not well established. There is some evidence that pathology in this area plays a role in restless legs syndrome, a condition in which people have difficulty sleeping due to an overwhelming compulsion to constantly move parts of the body, especially the legs.
The arcuate nucleus and the periventricular nucleus of the hypothalamus have dopamine neurons that form an important projection—the tuberoinfundibular pathway which goes to the pituitary gland, where it influences the secretion of the hormone prolactin. Dopamine is the primary neuroendocrine inhibitor of the secretion of prolactin from the anterior pituitary gland. Dopamine produced by neurons in the arcuate nucleus is secreted into the hypophyseal portal system of the median eminence, which supplies the pituitary gland. The prolactin cells that produce prolactin, in the absence of dopamine, secrete prolactin continuously; dopamine inhibits this secretion. In the context of regulating prolactin secretion, dopamine is occasionally called prolactin-inhibiting factor, prolactin-inhibiting hormone, or prolactostatin.
The zona incerta, grouped between the arcuate and periventricular nuclei, projects to several areas of the hypothalamus, and participates in the control of gonadotropin-releasing hormone, which is necessary to activate the development of the male and female reproductive systems, following puberty.
An additional group of dopamine-secreting neurons is found in the retina of the eye. These neurons are amacrine cells, meaning that they have no axons. They release dopamine into the extracellular medium, and are specifically active during daylight hours, becoming silent at night. This retinal dopamine acts to enhance the activity of cone cells in the retina while suppressing rod cells—the result is to increase sensitivity to colour and contrast during bright light conditions, at the cost of reduced sensitivity when the light is dim.
Basal Ganglia
The largest and most important sources of dopamine in the vertebrate brain are the substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area. These structures are closely related to each other and functionally similar in many respects. Both are components of the mid brain. The largest component of the basal ganglia is the striatum. The substantia nigra sends a dopaminergic projection to the dorsal striatum, while the ventral tegmental area sends a similar type of dopaminergic projection to the ventral striatum.
Progress in understanding the functions of the basal ganglia has been slow. The most popular hypotheses, broadly stated, propose that the basal ganglia play a central role in action selection. The action selection theory in its simplest form proposes that when a person or animal is in a situation where several behaviours are possible, activity in the basal ganglia determines which of them is executed, by releasing that response from inhibition while continuing to inhibit other motor systems that if activated would generate competing behaviours. Thus the basal ganglia, in this concept, are responsible for initiating behaviours, but not for determining the details of how they are carried out. In other words, they essentially form a decision-making system.
The basal ganglia can be divided into several sectors, and each is involved in controlling particular types of actions. The ventral sector of the basal ganglia (containing the ventral striatum and ventral tegmental area) operates at the highest level of the hierarchy, selecting actions at the whole-organism level. The dorsal sectors (containing the dorsal striatum and substantia nigra) operate at lower levels, selecting the specific muscles and movements that are used to implement a given behaviour pattern.
Dopamine contributes to the action selection process in at least two important ways. First, it sets the “threshold” for initiating actions. The higher the level of dopamine activity, the lower the impetus required to evoke a given behaviour. As a consequence, high levels of dopamine lead to high levels of motor activity and impulsive behaviour; low levels of dopamine lead to torpor and slowed reactions. Parkinson’s disease, in which dopamine levels in the substantia nigra circuit are greatly reduced, is characterised by stiffness and difficulty initiating movement—however, when people with the disease are confronted with strong stimuli such as a serious threat, their reactions can be as vigorous as those of a healthy person. In the opposite direction, drugs that increase dopamine release, such as cocaine or amphetamine, can produce heightened levels of activity, including, at the extreme, psychomotor agitation and stereotyped movements.
The second important effect of dopamine is as a “teaching” signal. When an action is followed by an increase in dopamine activity, the basal ganglia circuit is altered in a way that makes the same response easier to evoke when similar situations arise in the future. This is a form of operant conditioning, in which dopamine plays the role of a reward signal.
Reward
In the language used to discuss the reward system, reward is the attractive and motivational property of a stimulus that induces appetitive behaviour (also known as approach behaviour) and consummatory behaviour. A rewarding stimulus is one that can induce the organism to approach it and choose to consume it. Pleasure, learning (e.g. classical and operant conditioning), and approach behaviour are the three main functions of reward. As an aspect of reward, pleasure provides a definition of reward; however, while all pleasurable stimuli are rewarding, not all rewarding stimuli are pleasurable (e.g. extrinsic rewards like money). The motivational or desirable aspect of rewarding stimuli is reflected by the approach behaviour that they induce, whereas the pleasure from intrinsic rewards results from consuming them after acquiring them. A neuropsychological model which distinguishes these two components of an intrinsically rewarding stimulus is the incentive salience model, where “wanting” or desire (less commonly, “seeking”) corresponds to appetitive or approach behaviour while “liking” or pleasure corresponds to consummatory behaviour. In human drug addicts, “wanting” becomes dissociated with “liking” as the desire to use an addictive drug increases, while the pleasure obtained from consuming it decreases due to drug tolerance.
Within the brain, dopamine functions partly as a global reward signal. An initial dopamine response to a rewarding stimulus encodes information about the salience, value, and context of a reward. In the context of reward-related learning, dopamine also functions as a reward prediction error signal, that is, the degree to which the value of a reward is unexpected. According to this hypothesis proposed by Montague, Dayan, and Sejnowski, rewards that are expected do not produce a second phasic dopamine response in certain dopaminergic cells, but rewards that are unexpected, or greater than expected, produce a short-lasting increase in synaptic dopamine, whereas the omission of an expected reward actually causes dopamine release to drop below its background level. The “prediction error” hypothesis has drawn particular interest from computational neuroscientists, because an influential computational-learning method known as temporal difference learning makes heavy use of a signal that encodes prediction error. This confluence of theory and data has led to a fertile interaction between neuroscientists and computer scientists interested in machine learning.
Evidence from microelectrode recordings from the brains of animals shows that dopamine neurons in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and substantia nigra are strongly activated by a wide variety of rewarding events. These reward-responsive dopamine neurons in the VTA and substantia nigra are crucial for reward-related cognition and serve as the central component of the reward system. The function of dopamine varies in each axonal projection from the VTA and substantia nigra; for example, the VTA–nucleus accumbens shell projection assigns incentive salience (“want”) to rewarding stimuli and its associated cues, the VTA–prefrontal cortex projection updates the value of different goals in accordance with their incentive salience, the VTA–amygdala and VTA–hippocampus projections mediate the consolidation of reward-related memories, and both the VTA–nucleus accumbens core and substantia nigra–dorsal striatum pathways are involved in learning motor responses that facilitate the acquisition of rewarding stimuli. Some activity within the VTA dopaminergic projections appears to be associated with reward prediction as well.
Pleasure
While dopamine has a central role in causing “wanting,” associated with the appetitive or approach behavioural responses to rewarding stimuli, detailed studies have shown that dopamine cannot simply be equated with hedonic “liking” or pleasure, as reflected in the consummatory behavioural response. Dopamine neurotransmission is involved in some but not all aspects of pleasure-related cognition, since pleasure centres have been identified both within the dopamine system (i.e. nucleus accumbens shell) and outside the dopamine system (i.e. ventral pallidum and parabrachial nucleus). For example, direct electrical stimulation of dopamine pathways, using electrodes implanted in the brain, is experienced as pleasurable, and many types of animals are willing to work to obtain it. Antipsychotic drugs reduce dopamine levels and tend to cause anhedonia, a diminished ability to experience pleasure. Many types of pleasurable experiences—such as sexual intercourse, eating, and playing video games—increase dopamine release. All addictive drugs directly or indirectly affect dopamine neurotransmission in the nucleus accumbens; these drugs increase drug “wanting”, leading to compulsive drug use, when repeatedly taken in high doses, presumably through the sensitization of incentive-salience. Drugs that increase synaptic dopamine concentrations include psychostimulants such as methamphetamine and cocaine. These produce increases in “wanting” behaviours, but do not greatly alter expressions of pleasure or change levels of satiation. However, opiate drugs such as heroin and morphine produce increases in expressions of “liking” and “wanting” behaviours. Moreover, animals in which the ventral tegmental dopamine system has been rendered inactive do not seek food, and will starve to death if left to themselves, but if food is placed in their mouths they will consume it and show expressions indicative of pleasure.
A clinical study from January 2019 that assessed the effect of a dopamine precursor (levodopa), dopamine antagonist (risperidone), and a placebo on reward responses to music – including the degree of pleasure experienced during musical chills, as measured by changes in electrodermal activity as well as subjective ratings – found that the manipulation of dopamine neurotransmission bidirectionally regulates pleasure cognition (specifically, the hedonic impact of music) in human subjects. This research demonstrated that increased dopamine neurotransmission acts as a sine qua non condition for pleasurable hedonic reactions to music in humans.
A study published in Nature in 1998 found evidence that playing video games releases dopamine in the human striatum. This dopamine is associated with learning, behaviour reinforcement, attention, and sensorimotor integration. Researchers used positron emission tomography scans and 11C-labelled raclopride to track dopamine levels in the brain during goal-directed motor tasks and found that dopamine release was positively correlated with task performance and was greatest in the ventral striatum. This was the first study to demonstrate the behavioural conditions under which dopamine is released in humans. It highlights the ability of positron emission tomography to detect neurotransmitter fluxes during changes in behaviour. According to research, potentially problematic video game use is related to personality traits such as low self-esteem and low self-efficacy, anxiety, aggression, and clinical symptoms of depression and anxiety disorders. Additionally, the reasons individuals play video games vary and may include coping, socialisation, and personal satisfaction. The DSM-5 defines Internet Gaming Disorder as a mental disorder closely related to Gambling Disorder. This has been supported by some researchers but has also caused controversy.
Outside the Central Nervous System
Dopamine does not cross the blood–brain barrier, so its synthesis and functions in peripheral areas are to a large degree independent of its synthesis and functions in the brain. A substantial amount of dopamine circulates in the bloodstream, but its functions there are not entirely clear. Dopamine is found in blood plasma at levels comparable to those of epinephrine, but in humans, over 95% of the dopamine in the plasma is in the form of dopamine sulfate, a conjugate produced by the enzyme sulfotransferase 1A3/1A4 acting on free dopamine. The bulk of this dopamine sulfate is produced in the mesenteric organs. The production of dopamine sulfate is thought to be a mechanism for detoxifying dopamine that is ingested as food or produced by the digestive process—levels in the plasma typically rise more than fifty-fold after a meal. Dopamine sulfate has no known biological functions and is excreted in urine.
The relatively small quantity of unconjugated dopamine in the bloodstream may be produced by the sympathetic nervous system, the digestive system, or possibly other organs. It may act on dopamine receptors in peripheral tissues, or be metabolized, or be converted to norepinephrine by the enzyme dopamine beta hydroxylase, which is released into the bloodstream by the adrenal medulla. Some dopamine receptors are located in the walls of arteries, where they act as a vasodilator and an inhibitor of norepinephrine release from postganglionic sympathetic nerves terminals (dopamine can inhibit norepinephrine release by acting on presynaptic dopamine receptors, and also on presynaptic α-1 receptors, like norepinephrine itself). These responses might be activated by dopamine released from the carotid body under conditions of low oxygen, but whether arterial dopamine receptors perform other biologically useful functions is not known.
Beyond its role in modulating blood flow, there are several peripheral systems in which dopamine circulates within a limited area and performs an exocrine or paracrine function. The peripheral systems in which dopamine plays an important role include the immune system, the kidneys and the pancreas.
Immune System
In the immune system dopamine acts upon receptors present on immune cells, especially lymphocytes. Dopamine can also affect immune cells in the spleen, bone marrow, and circulatory system. In addition, dopamine can be synthesized and released by immune cells themselves. The main effect of dopamine on lymphocytes is to reduce their activation level. The functional significance of this system is unclear, but it affords a possible route for interactions between the nervous system and immune system, and may be relevant to some autoimmune disorders.
Kidneys
The renal dopaminergic system is located in the cells of the nephron in the kidney, where all subtypes of dopamine receptors are present. Dopamine is also synthesized there, by tubule cells, and discharged into the tubular fluid. Its actions include increasing the blood supply to the kidneys, increasing the glomerular filtration rate, and increasing the excretion of sodium in the urine. Hence, defects in renal dopamine function can lead to reduced sodium excretion and consequently result in the development of high blood pressure. There is strong evidence that faults in the production of dopamine or in the receptors can result in a number of pathologies including oxidative stress, oedema, and either genetic or essential hypertension. Oxidative stress can itself cause hypertension. Defects in the system can also be caused by genetic factors or high blood pressure.
Pancreas
In the pancreas the role of dopamine is somewhat complex. The pancreas consists of two parts, an exocrine and an endocrine component. The exocrine part synthesizes and secretes digestive enzymes and other substances, including dopamine, into the small intestine. The function of this secreted dopamine after it enters the small intestine is not clearly established—the possibilities include protecting the intestinal mucosa from damage and reducing gastrointestinal motility (the rate at which content moves through the digestive system).
The pancreatic islets make up the endocrine part of the pancreas, and synthesize and secrete hormones including insulin into the bloodstream. There is evidence that the beta cells in the islets that synthesize insulin contain dopamine receptors, and that dopamine acts to reduce the amount of insulin they release. The source of their dopamine input is not clearly established—it may come from dopamine that circulates in the bloodstream and derives from the sympathetic nervous system, or it may be synthesized locally by other types of pancreatic cells.
Dopamine as a manufactured medication is sold under the trade names Intropin, Dopastat, and Revimine, among others. It is on the World Health Organisation’s List of Essential Medicines. It is most commonly used as a stimulant drug in the treatment of severe low blood pressure, slow heart rate, and cardiac arrest. It is especially important in treating these in newborn infants. It is given intravenously. Since the half-life of dopamine in plasma is very short – approximately one minute in adults, two minutes in newborn infants and up to five minutes in preterm infants – it is usually given in a continuous intravenous drip rather than a single injection.
Its effects, depending on dosage, include an increase in sodium excretion by the kidneys, an increase in urine output, an increase in heart rate, and an increase in blood pressure. At low doses it acts through the sympathetic nervous system to increase heart muscle contraction force and heart rate, thereby increasing cardiac output and blood pressure. Higher doses also cause vasoconstriction that further increases blood pressure. Older literature also describes very low doses thought to improve kidney function without other consequences, but recent reviews have concluded that doses at such low levels are not effective and may sometimes be harmful. While some effects result from stimulation of dopamine receptors, the prominent cardiovascular effects result from dopamine acting at α1, β1, and β2 adrenergic receptors.
Side effects of dopamine include negative effects on kidney function and irregular heartbeats. The LD50, or lethal dose which is expected to prove fatal in 50% of the population, has been found to be: 59 mg/kg (mouse; administered intravenously); 95 mg/kg (mouse; administered intraperitoneally); 163 mg/kg (rat; administered intraperitoneally); 79 mg/kg (dog; administered intravenously).
A fluorinated form of L-DOPA known as fluorodopa is available for use in positron emission tomography to assess the function of the nigrostriatal pathway.
Disease, Disorders, and Pharmacology
The dopamine system plays a central role in several significant medical conditions, including Parkinson’s disease, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, Tourette syndrome, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and addiction. Aside from dopamine itself, there are many other important drugs that act on dopamine systems in various parts of the brain or body. Some are used for medical or recreational purposes, but neurochemists have also developed a variety of research drugs, some of which bind with high affinity to specific types of dopamine receptors and either agonise or antagonise their effects, and many that affect other aspects of dopamine physiology, including dopamine transporter inhibitors, VMAT inhibitors, and enzyme inhibitors.
Aging Brain
A number of studies have reported an age-related decline in dopamine synthesis and dopamine receptor density (i.e. the number of receptors) in the brain. This decline has been shown to occur in the striatum and extrastriatal regions. Decreases in the D1, D2, and D3 receptors are well documented. The reduction of dopamine with aging is thought to be responsible for many neurological symptoms that increase in frequency with age, such as decreased arm swing and increased rigidity. Changes in dopamine levels may also cause age-related changes in cognitive flexibility.
Other neurotransmitters, such as serotonin and glutamate also show a decline in output with aging.
Multiple Sclerosis
Studies reported that dopamine imbalance influences the fatigue in multiple sclerosis. In patients with multiple sclerosis, dopamine inhibits production of IL-17 and IFN-γ by peripheral blood mononuclear cells.
Parkinson’s Disease
Parkinson’s disease is an age-related disorder characterized by movement disorders such as stiffness of the body, slowing of movement, and trembling of limbs when they are not in use. In advanced stages it progresses to dementia and eventually death. The main symptoms are caused by the loss of dopamine-secreting cells in the substantia nigra. These dopamine cells are especially vulnerable to damage, and a variety of insults, including encephalitis (as depicted in the book and movie “Awakenings”), repeated sports-related concussions, and some forms of chemical poisoning such as MPTP, can lead to substantial cell loss, producing a parkinsonian syndrome that is similar in its main features to Parkinson’s disease. Most cases of Parkinson’s disease, however, are idiopathic, meaning that the cause of cell death cannot be identified.
The most widely used treatment for parkinsonism is administration of L-DOPA, the metabolic precursor for dopamine. L-DOPA is converted to dopamine in the brain and various parts of the body by the enzyme DOPA decarboxylase. L-DOPA is used rather than dopamine itself because, unlike dopamine, it is capable of crossing the blood–brain barrier. It is often co-administered with an enzyme inhibitor of peripheral decarboxylation such as carbidopa or benserazide, to reduce the amount converted to dopamine in the periphery and thereby increase the amount of L-DOPA that enters the brain. When L-DOPA is administered regularly over a long time period, a variety of unpleasant side effects such as dyskinesia often begin to appear; even so, it is considered the best available long-term treatment option for most cases of Parkinson’s disease.
L-DOPA treatment cannot restore the dopamine cells that have been lost, but it causes the remaining cells to produce more dopamine, thereby compensating for the loss to at least some degree. In advanced stages the treatment begins to fail because the cell loss is so severe that the remaining ones cannot produce enough dopamine regardless of L-DOPA levels. Other drugs that enhance dopamine function, such as bromocriptine and pergolide, are also sometimes used to treat Parkinsonism, but in most cases L-DOPA appears to give the best trade-off between positive effects and negative side-effects.
Dopaminergic medications that are used to treat Parkinson’s disease are sometimes associated with the development of a dopamine dysregulation syndrome, which involves the overuse of dopaminergic medication and medication-induced compulsive engagement in natural rewards like gambling and sexual activity. The latter behaviours are similar to those observed in individuals with a behavioural addiction.
Drug Addiction and Psychostimulants
Cocaine, substituted amphetamines (including methamphetamine), Adderall, methylphenidate (marketed as Ritalin or Concerta), and other psychostimulants exert their effects primarily or partly by increasing dopamine levels in the brain by a variety of mechanisms. Cocaine and methylphenidate are dopamine transporter blockers or reuptake inhibitors; they non-competitively inhibit dopamine reuptake, resulting in increased dopamine concentrations in the synaptic cleft. Like cocaine, substituted amphetamines and amphetamine also increase the concentration of dopamine in the synaptic cleft, but by different mechanisms.
The effects of psychostimulants include increases in heart rate, body temperature, and sweating; improvements in alertness, attention, and endurance; increases in pleasure produced by rewarding events; but at higher doses agitation, anxiety, or even loss of contact with reality. Drugs in this group can have a high addiction potential, due to their activating effects on the dopamine-mediated reward system in the brain. However some can also be useful, at lower doses, for treating attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and narcolepsy. An important differentiating factor is the onset and duration of action. Cocaine can take effect in seconds if it is injected or inhaled in free base form; the effects last from 5 to 90 minutes. This rapid and brief action makes its effects easily perceived and consequently gives it high addiction potential. Methylphenidate taken in pill form, in contrast, can take two hours to reach peak levels in the bloodstream, and depending on formulation the effects can last for up to 12 hours. These longer acting formulations have the benefit of reducing the potential for abuse, and improving adherence for treatment by using more convenient dosage regimens.
A variety of addictive drugs produce an increase in reward-related dopamine activity. Stimulants such as nicotine, cocaine and methamphetamine promote increased levels of dopamine which appear to be the primary factor in causing addiction. For other addictive drugs such as the opioid heroin, the increased levels of dopamine in the reward system may play only a minor role in addiction. When people addicted to stimulants go through withdrawal, they do not experience the physical suffering associated with alcohol withdrawal or withdrawal from opiates; instead they experience craving, an intense desire for the drug characterised by irritability, restlessness, and other arousal symptoms, brought about by psychological dependence.
The dopamine system plays a crucial role in several aspects of addiction. At the earliest stage, genetic differences that alter the expression of dopamine receptors in the brain can predict whether a person will find stimulants appealing or aversive. Consumption of stimulants produces increases in brain dopamine levels that last from minutes to hours. Finally, the chronic elevation in dopamine that comes with repetitive high-dose stimulant consumption triggers a wide-ranging set of structural changes in the brain that are responsible for the behavioural abnormalities which characterise an addiction. Treatment of stimulant addiction is very difficult, because even if consumption ceases, the craving that comes with psychological withdrawal does not. Even when the craving seems to be extinct, it may re-emerge when faced with stimuli that are associated with the drug, such as friends, locations and situations. Association networks in the brain are greatly interlinked.
Psychiatrists in the early 1950s discovered that a class of drugs known as typical antipsychotics (also known as major tranquilisers), were often effective at reducing the psychotic symptoms of schizophrenia. The introduction of the first widely used antipsychotic, chlorpromazine (Thorazine), in the 1950s, led to the release of many patients with schizophrenia from institutions in the years that followed. By the 1970s researchers understood that these typical antipsychotics worked as antagonists on the D2 receptors. This realisation led to the so-called dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia, which postulates that schizophrenia is largely caused by hyperactivity of brain dopamine systems. The dopamine hypothesis drew additional support from the observation that psychotic symptoms were often intensified by dopamine-enhancing stimulants such as methamphetamine, and that these drugs could also produce psychosis in healthy people if taken in large enough doses. In the following decades other atypical antipsychotics that had fewer serious side effects were developed. Many of these newer drugs do not act directly on dopamine receptors, but instead produce alterations in dopamine activity indirectly. These drugs were also used to treat other psychoses. Antipsychotic drugs have a broadly suppressive effect on most types of active behavior, and particularly reduce the delusional and agitated behavior characteristic of overt psychosis.
Later observations, however, have caused the dopamine hypothesis to lose popularity, at least in its simple original form. For one thing, patients with schizophrenia do not typically show measurably increased levels of brain dopamine activity. Even so, many psychiatrists and neuroscientists continue to believe that schizophrenia involves some sort of dopamine system dysfunction. As the “dopamine hypothesis” has evolved over time, however, the sorts of dysfunctions it postulates have tended to become increasingly subtle and complex.
Psychopharmacologist Stephen M. Stahl suggested in a review of 2018 that in many cases of psychosis, including schizophrenia, three interconnected networks based on dopamine, serotonin, and glutamate – each on its own or in various combinations – contributed to an overexcitation of dopamine D2 receptors in the ventral striatum.
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
Altered dopamine neurotransmission is implicated in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), a condition associated with impaired cognitive control, in turn leading to problems with regulating attention (attentional control), inhibiting behaviours (inhibitory control), and forgetting things or missing details (working memory), among other problems. There are genetic links between dopamine receptors, the dopamine transporter, and ADHD, in addition to links to other neurotransmitter receptors and transporters. The most important relationship between dopamine and ADHD involves the drugs that are used to treat ADHD. Some of the most effective therapeutic agents for ADHD are psychostimulants such as methylphenidate (Ritalin, Concerta) and amphetamine (Evekeo, Adderall, Dexedrine), drugs that increase both dopamine and norepinephrine levels in the brain. The clinical effects of these psychostimulants in treating ADHD are mediated through the indirect activation of dopamine and norepinephrine receptors, specifically dopamine receptor D1 and adrenoceptor α2, in the prefrontal cortex.
Pain
Dopamine plays a role in pain processing in multiple levels of the central nervous system including the spinal cord, periaqueductal gray, thalamus, basal ganglia, and cingulate cortex. Decreased levels of dopamine have been associated with painful symptoms that frequently occur in Parkinson’s disease. Abnormalities in dopaminergic neurotransmission also occur in several painful clinical conditions, including burning mouth syndrome, fibromyalgia, and restless legs syndrome.
Nausea
Nausea and vomiting are largely determined by activity in the area postrema in the medulla of the brainstem, in a region known as the chemoreceptor trigger zone. This area contains a large population of type D2 dopamine receptors. Consequently, drugs that activate D2 receptors have a high potential to cause nausea. This group includes some medications that are administered for Parkinson’s disease, as well as other dopamine agonists such as apomorphine. In some cases, D2-receptor antagonists such as metoclopramide are useful as anti-nausea drugs.
Comparative Biology and Evolution
Microorganisms
There are no reports of dopamine in archaea, but it has been detected in some types of bacteria and in the protozoan called Tetrahymena. Perhaps more importantly, there are types of bacteria that contain homologs of all the enzymes that animals use to synthesize dopamine. It has been proposed that animals derived their dopamine-synthesizing machinery from bacteria, via horizontal gene transfer that may have occurred relatively late in evolutionary time, perhaps as a result of the symbiotic incorporation of bacteria into eukaryotic cells that gave rise to mitochondria.
Animals
Dopamine is used as a neurotransmitter in most multicellular animals. In sponges there is only a single report of the presence of dopamine, with no indication of its function; however, dopamine has been reported in the nervous systems of many other radially symmetric species, including the cnidarian jellyfish, hydra and some corals. This dates the emergence of dopamine as a neurotransmitter back to the earliest appearance of the nervous system, over 500 million years ago in the Cambrian Period. Dopamine functions as a neurotransmitter in vertebrates, echinoderms, arthropods, molluscs, and several types of worm.
In every type of animal that has been examined, dopamine has been seen to modify motor behaviour. In the model organism, nematode Caenorhabditis elegans, it reduces locomotion and increases food-exploratory movements; in flatworms it produces “screw-like” movements; in leeches it inhibits swimming and promotes crawling. Across a wide range of vertebrates, dopamine has an “activating” effect on behaviour-switching and response selection, comparable to its effect in mammals.
Dopamine has also consistently been shown to play a role in reward learning, in all animal groups. As in all vertebrates – invertebrates such as roundworms, flatworms, molluscs and common fruit flies can all be trained to repeat an action if it is consistently followed by an increase in dopamine levels. In fruit flies, distinct elements for reward learning suggest a modular structure to the insect reward processing system that broadly parallels that in the mammalian one. For example, dopamine regulates short- and long-term learning in monkeys; in fruit flies, different groups of dopamine neurons mediate reward signals for short- and long-term memories.
It had long been believed that arthropods were an exception to this with dopamine being seen as having an adverse effect. Reward was seen to be mediated instead by octopamine, a neurotransmitter closely related to norepinephrine. More recent studies, however, have shown that dopamine does play a part in reward learning in fruit flies. It has also been found that the rewarding effect of octopamine is due to its activating a set of dopaminergic neurons not previously accessed in the research.
Plants
Many plants, including a variety of food plants, synthesize dopamine to varying degrees. The highest concentrations have been observed in bananas—the fruit pulp of red and yellow bananas contains dopamine at levels of 40 to 50 parts per million by weight. Potatoes, avocados, broccoli, and Brussels sprouts may also contain dopamine at levels of 1 part per million or more; oranges, tomatoes, spinach, beans, and other plants contain measurable concentrations less than 1 part per million. The dopamine in plants is synthesized from the amino acid tyrosine, by biochemical mechanisms similar to those that animals use. It can be metabolized in a variety of ways, producing melanin and a variety of alkaloids as byproducts. The functions of plant catecholamines have not been clearly established, but there is evidence that they play a role in the response to stressors such as bacterial infection, act as growth-promoting factors in some situations, and modify the way that sugars are metabolised. The receptors that mediate these actions have not yet been identified, nor have the intracellular mechanisms that they activate.
Dopamine consumed in food cannot act on the brain, because it cannot cross the blood–brain barrier. However, there are also a variety of plants that contain L-DOPA, the metabolic precursor of dopamine. The highest concentrations are found in the leaves and bean pods of plants of the genus Mucuna, especially in Mucuna pruriens (velvet beans), which have been used as a source for L-DOPA as a drug. Another plant containing substantial amounts of L-DOPA is Vicia faba, the plant that produces fava beans (also known as “broad beans”). The level of L-DOPA in the beans, however, is much lower than in the pod shells and other parts of the plant. The seeds of Cassia and Bauhinia trees also contain substantial amounts of L-DOPA.
In a species of marine green algae Ulvaria obscura, a major component of some algal blooms, dopamine is present in very high concentrations, estimated at 4.4% of dry weight. There is evidence that this dopamine functions as an anti-herbivore defence, reducing consumption by snails and isopods.
As a Precursor for Melanin
Melanins are a family of dark-pigmented substances found in a wide range of organisms. Chemically they are closely related to dopamine, and there is a type of melanin, known as dopamine-melanin, that can be synthesized by oxidation of dopamine via the enzyme tyrosinase. The melanin that darkens human skin is not of this type: it is synthesized by a pathway that uses L-DOPA as a precursor but not dopamine. However, there is substantial evidence that the neuromelanin that gives a dark colour to the brain’s substantia nigra is at least in part dopamine-melanin.
Dopamine-derived melanin probably appears in at least some other biological systems as well. Some of the dopamine in plants is likely to be used as a precursor for dopamine-melanin. The complex patterns that appear on butterfly wings, as well as black-and-white stripes on the bodies of insect larvae, are also thought to be caused by spatially structured accumulations of dopamine-melanin.
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Dual diagnosis (also called co-occurring disorders (COD) or dual pathology) is the condition of having a mental illness and a comorbid substance use disorder.
There is considerable debate surrounding the appropriateness of using a single category for a heterogeneous group of individuals with complex needs and a varied range of problems. The concept can be used broadly, for example depression and alcohol use disorder, or it can be restricted to specify severe mental illness (e.g. psychosis, schizophrenia) and substance use disorder (e.g. cannabis use), or a person who has a milder mental illness and a drug dependency, such as panic disorder or generalised anxiety disorder and is dependent on opioids. Diagnosing a primary psychiatric illness in people who use substances is challenging as substance use disorder itself often induces psychiatric symptoms, thus making it necessary to differentiate between substance induced and pre-existing mental illness.
Those with co-occurring disorders face complex challenges. They have increased rates of relapse, hospitalisation, homelessness, and HIV and hepatitis C infection compared to those with either mental or substance use disorders alone.
Brief History
The traditional method for treating patients with dual diagnosis was a parallel treatment programme. In this format, patients received mental health services from one clinician while addressing their substance use with a separate clinician. However, researchers found that parallel treatments were ineffective, suggesting a need to integrate the services addressing mental health with those addressing substance use.
During the mid-1980s, a number of initiatives began to combine mental health and substance use disorder services in an attempt to meet this need. These programmes worked to shift the method of treatment for substance use from a confrontational approach to a supportive one. They also introduced new methods to motivate clients and worked with them to develop long-term goals for their care. Although the studies conducted by these initiatives did not have control groups, their results were promising and became the basis for more rigorous efforts to study and develop models of integrated treatment.
Differentiating Pre-Existing and Substance Induced
The identification of substance-induced versus independent psychiatric symptoms or disorders has important treatment implications and often constitutes a challenge in daily clinical practice. Similar patterns of comorbidity and risk factors in individuals with substance induced disorder and those with independent non-substance induced psychiatric symptoms suggest that the two conditions may share underlying etiologic factors.
Substance use disorders, including those of alcohol and prescription medications, can induce a set of symptoms which resembles mental illness, which can make it difficult to differentiate between substance induced psychiatric syndromes and pre-existing mental health problems. More often than not psychiatric disorders among people who use alcohol or illicit substances disappear with prolonged abstinence. Substance induced psychiatric symptoms can occur both in the intoxicated state and also during the withdrawal state. In some cases, these substance induced psychiatric disorders can persist long after detoxification, such as prolonged psychosis or depression after amphetamine or cocaine use. Use of hallucinogens can trigger delusional and other psychotic phenomena long after cessation of use and cannabis may trigger panic attacks during intoxication and with use it may cause a state similar to dysthymia. Severe anxiety and depression are commonly induced by sustained alcohol use which in most cases abates with prolonged abstinence. Even moderate sustained use of alcohol may increase anxiety and depression levels in some individuals. In most cases these drug induced psychiatric disorders fade away with prolonged abstinence. A protracted withdrawal syndrome can also occur with psychiatric and other symptoms persisting for months after cessation of use. Among the currently prevalent medications, benzodiazepines are the most notable drug for inducing prolonged withdrawal effects with symptoms sometimes persisting for years after cessation of use.
Prospective epidemiological studies do not support the hypotheses that comorbidity of substance use disorders with other psychiatric illnesses is primarily a consequence of substance use or dependence or that increasing comorbidity is largely attributable to increasing use of substances.[8] Yet emphasis is often on the effects of substances on the brain creating the impression that dual disorders are a natural consequence of these substances. However, addictive drugs or exposure to gambling will not lead to addictive behaviors or drug dependence in most individuals but only in vulnerable ones, although, according to some researchers, neuroadaptation or regulation of neuronal plasticity, and molecular changes, may alter gene expression in some cases and subsequently lead to substance use disorders.
Research instruments are also often insufficiently sensitive to discriminate between independent, true dual pathology, and substance-induced symptoms. Structured instruments, as Global Appraisal of Individual Needs – Short Screener-GAIN-SS and Psychiatric Research Interview for Substance and Mental Disorders for DSM-IV-PRISM,[9] have been developed to increase the diagnostic validity. While structured instruments can help organize diagnostic information, clinicians must still make judgments on the origin of symptoms.
Prevalence
Comorbidity of addictive disorders and other psychiatric disorders, i.e. dual disorders, is very common and a large body of literature has accumulated demonstrating that mental disorders are strongly associated with substance use disorders. The 2011 USA National Survey on Drug Use and Health found that 17.5% of adults with a mental illness had a co-occurring substance use disorder; this works out to 7.98 million people. Estimates of co-occurring disorders in Canada are even higher, with an estimated 40-60% of adults with a severe and persistent mental illness experiencing a substance use disorder in their lifetime.
A study by Kessler et al. in the United States attempting to assess the prevalence of dual diagnosis found that 47% of clients with schizophrenia had a substance misuse disorder at some time in their life, and the chances of developing a substance misuse disorder was significantly higher among patients with a psychotic illness than in those without a psychotic illness.
Another study looked at the extent of substance misuse in a group of 187 chronically mentally ill patients living in the community. According to the clinician’s ratings, around a third of the sample used alcohol, street drugs, or both during the six months before evaluation.
Further UK studies have shown slightly more moderate rates of substance misuse among mentally ill individuals. One study found that individuals with schizophrenia showed just a 7% prevalence of problematic drug use in the year prior to being interviewed and 21% reported problematic use some time before that.
Wright and colleagues identified individuals with psychotic illnesses who had been in contact with services in the London borough of Croydon over the previous 6 months. Cases of alcohol or substance misuse and dependence were identified through standardized interviews with clients and keyworkers. Results showed that prevalence rates of dual diagnosis were 33% for the use of any substance, 20% for alcohol misuse only and 5% for drug misuse only. A lifetime history of any illicit drug use was observed in 35% of the sample.
Diagnosis
Substance use disorders can be confused with other psychiatric disorders. There are diagnoses for substance-induced mood disorders and substance-induced anxiety disorders and thus such overlap can be complicated. For this reason, the DSM-IV advises that diagnoses of primary psychiatric disorders not be made in the absence of sobriety (of a duration sufficient to allow for any substance-induced post-acute-withdrawal symptoms to dissipate) up to 1 year.
Treatment
Only a small proportion of those with co-occurring disorders actually receive treatment for both disorders. Therefore, it was argued that a new approach is needed to enable clinicians, researchers and managers to offer adequate assessment and evidence-based treatments to patients with dual pathology, who cannot be adequately and efficiently managed by cross-referral between psychiatric and addiction services as currently configured and resourced. In 2011, it was estimated that only 12.4% of American adults with co-occurring disorders were receiving both mental health and addictions treatment. Clients with co-occurring disorders face challenges accessing treatment, as they may be excluded from mental health services if they admit to a substance use problem and vice versa.
There are multiple approaches to treat concurrent disorders. Partial treatment involves treating only the disorder that is considered primary. Sequential treatment involves treating the primary disorder first, and then treating the secondary disorder after the primary disorder has been stabilised. Parallel treatment involves the client receiving mental health services from one provider, and addictions services from another.
Integrated treatment involves a seamless blending of interventions into a single coherent treatment package developed with a consistent philosophy and approach among care providers. With this approach, both disorders are considered primary. Integrated treatment can improve accessibility, service individualisation, engagement in treatment, treatment compliance, mental health symptoms, and overall outcomes. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration in the United States describes integrated treatment as being in the best interests or clients, programmes, funders, and systems. Green suggested that treatment should be integrated, and a collaborative process between the treatment team and the patient. Furthermore, recovery should to be viewed as a marathon rather than a sprint, and methods and outcome goals should be explicit.
A 2019 Cochrane meta-analysis that included 41 randomised controlled trials found no high-quality evidence in support of anyone psycho-social intervention over standard care for outcomes such as remaining in treatment, reduction in substance use and/or improvement in global functioning and mental status.
Theories of Dual Diagnosis
There are a number of theories that explain the relationship between mental illness and substance use.
Causality
The causality theory suggests that certain types of substance use may causally lead to mental illness.
There is strong evidence that using cannabis can produce psychotic and affective experiences. When it comes to persisting effects, there is a clear increase in the incidence of psychotic outcomes in people who had used cannabis, even when they had used it only once. More frequent use of cannabis strongly augmented the risk for psychosis. The evidence for affective outcomes is less strong. However, this connection between cannabis and psychosis does not prove that cannabis causes psychotic disorders. The causality theory for cannabis has been challenged as despite explosive increases in cannabis consumption over the past 40 years in western society, the rate of schizophrenia (and psychosis in general) has remained relatively stable.
Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
One in four people who have a substance use disorder also have attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), which makes the treatment of both conditions more difficult. ADHD is associated with an increased craving for drugs. Having ADHD makes it more likely that an individual will initiate substance misuse at a younger age than their peers. They are also more likely to experience poorer outcomes, such as longer time to remission, and to have increased psychiatric complications from substance misuse. While generally stimulant medications do not seem to worsen substance use, they are known to be non-medically used in some cases. Psychosocial therapy and/or nonstimulant medications and extended release stimulants are ADHD treatment options that reduce these risks.
Autism Spectrum Disorder
Unlike ADHD, which significantly increases the risk of substance use disorder, autism spectrum disorder has the opposite effect of significantly reducing the risk of substance use. This is because introversion, inhibition and lack of sensation seeking personality traits, which are typical of autism spectrum disorder, protect against substance use and thus substance use levels are low in individuals who are on the autism spectrum. However, certain forms of substance use disorders, especially alcohol use disorder, can cause or worsen certain neuropsychological symptoms which are common to autism spectrum disorder. This includes impaired social skills due to the neurotoxic effects of alcohol on the brain, especially in the prefrontal cortex area of the brain. The social skills that are impaired by alcohol use disorder include impairments in perceiving facial emotions, prosody perception problems and theory of mind deficits; the ability to understand humour is also impaired in people who consume excessive amounts of alcohol.
Gambling
The inclusion of behavioural addictions like pathological gambling must change our way of understanding and dealing with addictions. Pathological (disordered) gambling has commonalities in clinical expression, aetiology, comorbidity, physiology and treatment with substance use disorders (DSM-5). A challenge is to understand the development of compulsivity at a neurochemical level not only for drugs.
Past Exposure to Psychiatric Medications Theory
The past exposure theory suggests that exposure to psychiatric medication alters neural synapses, introducing an imbalance that was not previously present. Discontinuation of the drug is expected to result in symptoms of psychiatric illness which resolve once the drug is restarted. This theory suggests that while it may appear that the medication is working, it is only treating a disorder caused by the medication itself. New exposure to psychiatric medication may lead to heightened sensitivity to the effects of drugs such as alcohol, which has a deteriorating effect on the patient.
Self-Medication Theory
The self-medication theory suggests that people with severe mental illnesses misuse substances in order to relieve a specific set of symptoms and counter the negative side-effects of antipsychotic medication.
Khantizan proposes that substances are not randomly chosen, but are specifically selected for their effects. For example, using stimulants such as nicotine or amphetamines can be used to combat the sedation that can be caused by higher doses of certain types of antipsychotic medication. Conversely, some people taking medications with a stimulant effect such as the SNRI antidepressants Effexor (venlafaxine) or Wellbutrin (bupropion) may seek out benzodiazepines or opioid narcotics to counter the anxiety and insomnia that such medications sometimes evoke.
Some studies show that nicotine administration can be effective for reducing motor side-effects of antipsychotics, with both bradykinesia (stiff muscles) and dyskinesia (involuntary movement) being prevented.
Alleviation of Dysphoria Theory
The alleviation of dysphoria theory suggests that people with severe mental illness commonly have a negative self-image, which makes them vulnerable to using psychoactive substances to alleviate these feelings. Despite the existence of a wide range of dysphoric feelings (anxiety, depression, boredom, and loneliness), the literature on self-reported reasons for use seems to lend support for the experience of these feelings being the primary motivator for alcohol use disorder and other drug misuse.
Multiple Risk Factor Theory
Another theory is that there may be shared risk factors that can lead to both substance use and mental illness. Mueser hypothesizes that these may include factors such as social isolation, poverty, lack of structured daily activity, lack of adult role responsibility, living in areas with high drug availability, and association with people who already misuse drugs.
Other evidence suggests that traumatic life events, such as sexual abuse, are associated with the development of psychiatric problems and substance use.
The Supersensitivity Theory
The supersensitivity theory proposes that certain individuals who have severe mental illness also have biological and psychological vulnerabilities, caused by genetic and early environmental life events. These interact with stressful life events and can result in either a psychiatric disorder or trigger a relapse into an existing illness. The theory states that although anti-psychotic medication can reduce the vulnerability, substance use may increase it, causing the individual to be more likely to experience negative consequences from using relatively small amounts of substances. These individuals, therefore, are “supersensitive” to the effects of certain substances, and individuals with psychotic illness such as schizophrenia may be less capable of sustaining moderate substance use over time without experiencing negative symptoms.
Although there are limitations in the research studies conducted in this area, namely that most have focused primarily on schizophrenia, this theory provides an explanation of why relatively low levels of substance misuse often result in negative consequences for individuals with severe mental illness.
Avoiding Categorical Diagnosis
Current nosological approach does not provide a framework for internal (sub-threshold symptoms) or external (comorbidity) heterogeneity of the different diagnostic categories. The prevailing “Neo-Kraepelinian” diagnostic system solely accounts for a categorical diagnosis, therefore not allowing for the possibility of dual diagnosis. There has been substantial criticism to the DSM-IV, due to problems of diagnostic overlap, lack of clear boundaries between normality and disease, a failure to take into account findings from novel research and the lack of diagnostic stability over time.
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The World Council for Psychotherapy is an NGO with consultative status at the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. It was founded in 1995, has its headquarters in Vienna, and holds a World Congress every three years with more than a thousand participants.
Objectives
The main objectives of the association are the promotion of psychotherapy on all continents (based on the principles in the Strasbourg Declaration on Psychotherapy in 1990), to improve the conditions of patients, to cooperate with national and international organizations to improve crisis management and peacekeeping, and to unify world training standards. Members are both psychotherapists and organisations. President of the WCP is Alfred Pritz.
The World Certificate for Psychotherapy (WCPC) is only awarded on the basis of recognized psychotherapy training and aims to encourage mobility within the profession. Each year, together with the city of Vienna, the Council awards the International Sigmund Freud Award for Psychotherapy.
The European Association for Psychotherapy (EAP) is a Vienna-based umbrella organisation for 128 psychotherapist organisations (including 28 national associations and 17 European associations) from 42 countries with a membership of more than 120,000 psychotherapists.
Outline
Individual members may also join the organisation directly rather than through one of its member organisations.
The EAP has sponsored much of the European effort from the mid-1990s toward the professionalisation of psychotherapy and the formation of pan-European training standards, ethics and guidelines.
A submission to the European Commission to establish the Common Training Framework for the Profession of Psychotherapist is currently in process (2021).
The President of EAP is Irena Bezić (Croatia); the general secretary of the EAP is Prof. Eugenijus Laurinaitis (Lithuania).
The association is based on the Strasbourg Declaration on Psychotherapy of 1990 whereby the EAP promotes the need for high standards of training on a scientific basis, and fights for free and independent exercise of psychotherapy in Europe. Important activities include:
Creating a collaborative democratic forum for all European national and method-based professional associations in psychotherapy.
Establishing pan-European professional post-graduate training standards consisting of a minimum of 2,400 hours, over a minimum of four years, of specialist training, with a significant component of supervised practice.
Awarding the European Certificate of Psychotherapy (ECP): The aim of the European Certificate of Psychotherapy is to implement a comparable standard of training and mutual recognition of training across Europe.
Building the Register for ECP Psychotherapists: creating a searchable database of the availability of over 5,000 psychotherapists in Europe.
Promoting EAP Ethical Guidelines: The EAP has developed ethical guidelines to protect patients and is establishing these across Europe.
Publication of the International Journal of Psychotherapy ISSN 1356-9082, a professional journal with 3 issues per annum.
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A mental state, or a mental property, is a state of mind of a person. Mental states comprise a diverse class, including perception, pain/pleasure experience, belief, desire, intention, emotion, and memory. There is controversy concerning the exact definition of the term. According to epistemic approaches, the essential mark of mental states is that their subject has privileged epistemic access while others can only infer their existence from outward signs. Consciousness-based approaches hold that all mental states are either conscious themselves or stand in the right relation to conscious states. Intentionality-based approaches, on the other hand, see the power of minds to refer to objects and represent the world as the mark of the mental. According to functionalist approaches, mental states are defined in terms of their role in the causal network independent of their intrinsic properties.
Some philosophers deny all the aforementioned approaches by holding that the term “mental” refers to a cluster of loosely related ideas without an underlying unifying feature shared by all. Various overlapping classifications of mental states have been proposed. Important distinctions group mental phenomena together according to whether they are sensory, propositional, intentional, conscious or occurrent. Sensory states involve sense impressions like visual perceptions or bodily pains. Propositional attitudes, like beliefs and desires, are relations a subject has to a proposition. The characteristic of intentional states is that they refer to or are about objects or states of affairs. Conscious states are part of the phenomenal experience while occurrent states are causally efficacious within the owner’s mind, with or without consciousness. An influential classification of mental states is due to Franz Brentano, who argues that there are only three basic kinds: presentations, judgements, and phenomena of love and hate.
Mental states are usually contrasted with physical or material aspects. For (non-eliminative) physicalists, they are a kind of high-level property that can be understood in terms of fine-grained neural activity. Property dualists, on the other hand, claim that no such reductive explanation is possible. Eliminativists may reject the existence of mental properties, or at least of those corresponding to folk psychological categories such as thought and memory. Mental states play an important role in various fields, including philosophy of mind, epistemology and cognitive science. In psychology, the term is used not just to refer to the individual mental states listed above but also to a more global assessment of a person’s mental health.
Definition
Various competing theories have been proposed about what the essential features of all mental states are, sometimes referred to as the search for the “mark of the mental”. These theories can roughly be divided into epistemic approaches, consciousness-based approaches, intentionality-based approaches and functionalism. These approaches disagree not just on how mentality is to be defined but also on which states count as mental. Mental states encompass a diverse group of aspects of an entity, like this entity’s beliefs, desires, intentions, or pain experiences. The different approaches often result in a satisfactory characterization of only some of them. This has prompted some philosophers to doubt that there is a unifying mark of the mental and instead see the term “mental” as referring to a cluster of loosely related ideas. Mental states are usually contrasted with physical or material aspects. This contrast is commonly based on the idea that certain features of mental phenomena are not present in the material universe as described by the natural sciences and may even be incompatible with it.
Central to epistemic approaches is the idea that the subject has privileged epistemic access to her mental states. In this view, a state of a subject constitutes a mental state if and only if the subject has privileged access to it. It has been argued that this access is non-inferential, infallible and private. Non-inferential access is insufficient as a mark of the mind if one accepts that we have non-inferential knowledge of non-mental things, for example, in regular perception or in bodily experience. It is sometimes held that knowledge of one’s own mental states is infallible, i.e. that the subject cannot be wrong about having them. But while this may be true for some conscious mental states, there are various counterexamples, like unconscious mental states or conscious emotions that we don’t know how to categorise. The most influential characterisation of privileged access has been that it is private, i.e. that mental states are known primarily just by the subject and only through their symptoms like speech acts or other expressions by other people. An influential but not universally accepted argument against this tradition is the private language argument due to Ludwig Wittgenstein. He argues that mental states cannot be private because if they were, we would not be able to refer to them using public language.
Consciousness-based approaches hold that all mental states are either conscious themselves or stand in the right relation to conscious states. There is controversy concerning how this relation is to be characterised. One prominent early version, due to John Searle, states that non-conscious states are mental if they constitute dispositions to bring about conscious states. This usually leads to a hierarchical model of the mind seeing only conscious states as independent mental phenomena, which is often a point of dispute for opponents to consciousness-based approaches. According to this line of thought, some unconscious mental states exist independently of their conscious counterparts. They have been referred to as the “deep unconscious” and figures in the cognitive sciences and psychoanalysis. But whether this counterargument is successful depends both on allowing that the deep unconscious is actually mental and on how the dependency-relation denied by the deep unconscious is to be conceived.
Intentionality-based approaches see intentionality, i.e. that mental states refer to objects and represent how the world is, as the mark of the mental. This circumvents various problems faced by consciousness-based approaches since we ascribe representational contents both to conscious and to unconscious states. Two main arguments have been raised against this approach: that some representations, like maps, are not mental and that some mental states, like pain, are not representational. Proponents of intentionality-based approaches have responded to these arguments by giving a hierarchical explanation of how non-mental representations depend on mental representations, akin to the relation between unconscious and conscious states suggested in the last paragraph, and by trying to show how apparently non-representational mental states can be characterised as representational after all.
Functionalist approaches define mental states in terms of their role in the causal network. For example, a pain state may be characterized as what tends to be caused by bodily injury and to cause pain expressions like moaning. Behaviourism is one form of functionalism that restricts these characterisations to bodily reactions to external situations, often motivated by an attempt to avoid reference to inner or private states. Other forms of functionalism are more lenient in allowing both external and internal states to characterise the causal role of mental states. Phenomenal consciousness constitutes a difficulty for functionalist approaches since its intrinsic aspects are not captured by causal roles. For example, the causes and effects of pain leave out the fact that pain itself feels unpleasant.
Classifications of Mental States
There is a great variety of types of mental states, which can be classified according to various distinctions. These types include perception, belief, desire, intention, emotion and memory. Many of the proposed distinctions for these types have significant overlaps and some may even be identical. Sensory states involve sense impressions, which are absent in non-sensory states. Propositional attitudes are mental states that have propositional contents, in contrast to non-propositional states. Intentional states refer to or are about objects or states of affairs, a feature which non-intentional states lack. A mental state is conscious if it belongs to a phenomenal experience. Unconscious mental states are also part of the mind but they lack this phenomenal dimension. Occurrent mental states are active or causally efficacious within the owner’s mind while non-occurrent or standing states exist somewhere in the back of one’s mind but do not currently play an active role in any mental processes. Certain mental states are rationally evaluable: they are either rational or irrational depending on whether they obey the norms of rationality. But other states are arational: they are outside the domain of rationality. A well-known classification is due to Franz Brentano, who distinguishes three basic categories of mental states: presentations, judgments, and phenomena of love and hate.
Types of Mental States
There is a great variety of types of mental states including perception, bodily awareness, thought, belief, desire, motivation, intention, deliberation, decision, pleasure, emotion, mood, imagination and memory. Some of these types are precisely contrasted with each other while other types may overlap. Perception involves the use of senses, like sight, touch, hearing, smell and taste, to acquire information about material objects and events in the external world. It contrasts with bodily awareness in this sense, which is about the internal ongoings in our body and which does not present its contents as independent objects. The objects given in perception, on the other hand, are directly (i.e. non-inferentially) presented as existing out there independently of the perceiver. Perception is usually considered to be reliable but our perceptual experiences may present false information at times and can thereby mislead us. The information received in perception is often further considered in thought, in which information is mentally represented and processed. Both perceptions and thoughts often result in the formation of new or the change of existing beliefs. Beliefs may amount to knowledge if they are justified and true. They are non-sensory cognitive propositional attitudes that have a mind-to-world direction of fit: they represent the world as being a certain way and aim at truth. They contrast with desires, which are conative propositional attitudes that have a world-to-mind direction of fit and aim to change the world by representing how it should be. Desires are closely related to agency: they motivate the agent and are thus involved in the formation of intentions. Intentions are plans to which the agent is committed and which may guide actions. Intention-formation is sometimes preceded by deliberation and decision, in which the advantages and disadvantages of different courses of action are considered before committing oneself to one course. It is commonly held that pleasure plays a central role in these considerations. “Pleasure” refers to experience that feels good, that involves the enjoyment of something. The topic of emotions is closely intertwined with that of agency and pleasure. Emotions are evaluative responses to external or internal stimuli that are associated with a feeling of pleasure or displeasure and motivate various behavioural reactions. Emotions are quite similar to moods, some differences being that moods tend to arise for longer durations at a time and that moods are usually not clearly triggered by or directed at a specific event or object. Imagination is even further removed from the actual world in that it represents things without aiming to show how they actually are. All the aforementioned states can leave traces in memory that make it possible to relive them at a later time in the form of episodic memory.
Sensation, Propositional Attitudes and Intentionality
An important distinction among mental states is between sensory and non-sensory states. Sensory states involve some form of sense impressions like visual perceptions, auditory impressions or bodily pains. Non-sensory states, like thought, rational intuition or the feeling of familiarity, lack sensory contents. Sensory states are sometimes equated with qualitative states and contrasted with propositional attitude states. Qualitative states involve qualia, which constitute the subjective feeling of having the state in question or what it is like to be in it. Propositional attitudes, on the other hand, are relations a subject has to a proposition. They are usually expressed by verbs like believe, desire, fear or hope together with a that-clause. So believing that it will rain today, for example, is a propositional attitude. It has been argued that the contrast between qualitative states and propositional attitudes is misleading since there is some form of subjective feel to certain propositional states like understanding a sentence or suddenly thinking of something. This would suggest that there are also non-sensory qualitative states and some propositional attitudes may be among them. Another problem with this contrast is that some states are both sensory and propositional. This is the case for perception, for example, which involves sensory impressions that represent what the world is like. This representational aspect is usually understood as involving a propositional attitude.
Closely related to these distinctions is the concept of intentionality. Intentionality is usually defined as the characteristic of mental states to refer to or be about objects or states of affairs. The belief that the moon has a circumference of 10921 km, for example, is a mental state that is intentional in virtue of being about the moon and its circumference. It is sometimes held that all mental states are intentional, i.e. that intentionality is the “mark of the mental”. This thesis is known as intentionalism. But this view has various opponents, who distinguish between intentional and non-intentional states. Putative examples of non-intentional states include various bodily experiences like pains and itches. Because of this association, it is sometimes held that all sensory states lack intentionality. But such a view ignores that certain sensory states, like perceptions, can be intentional at the same time. It is usually accepted that all propositional attitudes are intentional. But while the paradigmatic cases of intentionality are all propositional as well, there may be some intentional attitudes that are non-propositional. This could be the case when an intentional attitude is directed only at an object. In this view, Elsie’s fear of snakes is a non-propositional intentional attitude while Joseph’s fear that he will be bitten by snakes is a propositional intentional attitude.
Conscious and Unconscious
A mental state is conscious if it belongs to phenomenal experience. The subject is aware of the conscious mental states it is in: there is some subjective feeling to having them. Unconscious mental states are also part of the mind but they lack this phenomenal dimension. So it is possible for a subject to be in an unconscious mental state, like a repressed desire, without knowing about it. It is usually held that some types of mental states, like sensations or pains, can only occur as conscious mental states. But there are also other types, like beliefs and desires, that can be both conscious and unconscious. For example, many people share the belief that the moon is closer to the earth than to the sun. When considered, this belief becomes conscious, but it is unconscious most of the time otherwise. The relation between conscious and unconscious states is a controversial topic. It is often held that conscious states are in some sense more basic with unconscious mental states depending on them. One such approach states that unconscious states have to be accessible to consciousness, that they are dispositions of the subject to enter their corresponding conscious counterparts. On this position there can be no “deep unconscious”, i.e. unconscious mental states that can not become conscious.
The term “consciousness” is sometimes used not in the sense of phenomenal consciousness, as above, but in the sense of access consciousness. A mental state is conscious in this sense if the information it carries is available for reasoning and guiding behaviour, even if it is not associated with any subjective feel characterising the concurrent phenomenal experience. Being an access-conscious state is similar but not identical to being an occurrent mental state, the topic of the next section.
Occurrent and Standing
A mental state is occurrent if it is active or causally efficacious within the owner’s mind. Non-occurrent states are called standing or dispositional states. They exist somewhere in the back of one’s mind but currently play no active role in any mental processes. This distinction is sometimes identified with the distinction between phenomenally conscious and unconscious mental states. It seems to be the case that the two distinctions overlap but do not fully match despite the fact that all conscious states are occurrent. This is the case because unconscious states may become causally active while remaining unconscious. A repressed desire may affect the agent’s behaviour while remaining unconscious, which would be an example of an unconscious occurring mental state. The distinction between occurrent and standing is especially relevant for beliefs and desires. At any moment, there seems to be a great number of things we believe or things we want that are not relevant to our current situation. These states remain inactive in the back of one’s head even though one has them. For example, while Ann is engaged in her favourite computer game, she still believes that dogs have four legs and desires to get a pet dog on her next birthday. But these two states play no active role in her current state of mind. Another example comes from dreamless sleep when most or all of our mental states are standing states.
Rational, Irrational and Arational
Certain mental states, like beliefs and intentions, are rationally evaluable: they are either rational or irrational depending on whether they obey the norms of rationality. But other states, like urges, experiences of dizziness or hunger, are arational: they are outside the domain of rationality and can be neither rational nor irrational. An important distinction within rationality concerns the difference between theoretical and practical rationality. Theoretical rationality covers beliefs and their degrees while practical rationality focuses on desires, intentions and actions. Some theorists aim to provide a comprehensive account of all forms of rationality but it is more common to find separate treatments of specific forms of rationality that leave the relation to other forms of rationality open.
There are various competing definitions of what constitutes rationality but no universally accepted answer. Some accounts focus on the relation between mental states for determining whether a given state is rational. In one view, a state is rational if it is well-grounded in another state that acts as its source of justification. For example, Scarlet’s belief that it is raining in Manchester is rational because it is grounded in her perceptual experience of the rain while the same belief would be irrational for Frank since he lacks such a perceptual ground. A different version of such an approach holds that rationality is given in virtue of the coherence among the different mental states of a subject. This involves an holistic outlook that is less concerned with the rationality of individual mental states and more with the rationality of the person as a whole. Other accounts focus not on the relation between two or several mental states but on responding correctly to external reasons. Reasons are usually understood as facts that count in favour or against something. On this account, Scarlet’s aforementioned belief is rational because it responds correctly to the external fact that it’s raining, which constitutes a reason for holding this belief.
Classification According to Brentano
An influential classification of mental states is due to Franz Brentano. He argues that there are three basic kinds: presentations, judgments, and phenomena of love and hate. All mental states either belong to one of these kinds or are constituted by combinations of them. These different types differ not in content or what is presented but in mode or how it is presented. The most basic kind is presentation, which is involved in every mental state. Pure presentations, as in imagination, just show their object without any additional information about the veridical or evaluative aspects of their object. A judgement, on the other hand, is an attitude directed at a presentation that asserts that its presentation is either true or false, as is the case in regular perception. Phenomena of love and hate involve an evaluative attitude towards their presentation: they show how things ought to be, and the presented object is seen as either good or bad. This happens, for example, in desires. More complex types can be built up through combinations of these basic types. To be disappointed about an event, for example, can be construed as a judgement that this event happened together with a negative evaluation of it. Brentano’s distinction between judgments, phenomena of love and hate, and presentations is closely related to the more recent idea of direction of fit between mental state and world, i.e. mind-to-world direction of fit for judgements, the world-to-mind direction of fit for phenomena of love and hate and null direction of fit for mere presentations. Brentano’s tripartite system of classification has been modified in various ways by Brentano’s students. Alexius Meinong, for example, divides the category of phenomena of love and hate into two distinct categories: feelings and desires. Uriah Kriegel is a contemporary defender of Brentano’s approach to the classification of mental phenomena.
Academia
Discussions about mental states can be found in many areas of study.
In cognitive psychology and the philosophy of mind, a mental state is a kind of hypothetical state that corresponds to thinking and feeling, and consists of a conglomeration of mental representations and propositional attitudes. Several theories in philosophy and psychology try to determine the relationship between the agent’s mental state and a proposition.
Instead of looking into what a mental state is, in itself, clinical psychology and psychiatry determine a person’s mental health through a mental status examination.
Epistemology
Mental states also include attitudes towards propositions, of which there are at least two—factive and non-factive, both of which entail the mental state of acquaintance. To be acquainted with a proposition is to understand its meaning and be able to entertain it. The proposition can be true or false, and acquaintance requires no specific attitude towards that truth or falsity. Factive attitudes include those mental states that are attached to the truth of the proposition – i.e. the proposition entails truth. Some factive mental states include “perceiving that”, “remembering that”, “regretting that”, and (more controversially) “knowing that”. Non-factive attitudes do not entail the truth of the propositions to which they are attached. That is, one can be in one of these mental states and the proposition can be false. An example of a non-factive attitude is believing—people can believe a false proposition and people can believe a true proposition. Since there is the possibility of both, such mental states do not entail truth, and therefore, are not active. However, belief does entail an attitude of assent toward the presumed truth of the proposition (whether or not it’s so), making it and other non-factive attitudes different from a mere acquaintance.
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A nurse practitioner (NP) is an advanced practice registered nurse and a type of mid-level practitioner.
NPs are trained to assess patient needs, order and interpret diagnostic and laboratory tests, diagnose disease, formulate and prescribe medications and treatment plans. NP training covers basic disease prevention, coordination of care, and health promotion, but does not provide the depth of expertise needed to recognise more complex conditions.
The scope of practice for a NP is defined by legal jurisdiction. In 26 states of the United States (US), NPs have full practice authority, while in the remaining 24 states, NPs are required to work under the supervision of a physician. In Australia, the scope of practice is guided by health organisation policy and the individual’s competency, while their right to access Medicare rebates requires a Collaborative Practice Arrangement with a medical practitioner.
Brief History
United States
The present-day concept of advanced practice nursing as a primary care provider was created in the mid-1960s, spurred on by a national shortage of physicians. The first formal graduate certificate program for NPs was created by Henry Silver, a physician, and Loretta Ford, a nurse, in 1965. In 1971, The US Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Elliot Richardson, made a formal recommendation in expanding the scope of nursing practice to be able to serve as primary care providers. In 2012, discussions arose between accreditation agencies, national certifying bodies, and state boards of nursing about the possibility of making the Doctor of Nursing Practice (DNP) degree the new minimum standard of education for NP certification and licensure by 2015.
Canada
Advanced practice nursing first appeared in the 1990s in Ontario. These nurses practiced in neonatal intensive care units within tertiary care hospitals in collaboration with paediatricians and neonatologists. Although the role of these nurses initially resembled a blended version of clinical nurse specialists and NPs, today the distinction has been more formally established.
Nurse Practitioners in the United States
Education Requirements
Becoming a nurse practitioner in the US requires either a Master of Science in Nursing (MSN) or Doctor of Nursing Practice (DNP). During their studies, nurse practitioners are required to receive a minimum of 500 hours of clinical training in addition to the clinical hours required to obtain their RN. Upon completion of the graduate program, they must pass the National NP Certification Board Exam, specific to their specialisation. After passing this exam, candidates must apply for NP licensure which varies by state regulations.
Although nurse practitioners are required to be licensed as registered nurses prior to obtaining their advanced practice registered nurse certification, there are several programmes that combine a nursing undergraduate degree with nurse practitioner training. Other nurse practitioner programmes have 100% acceptance rates.
Training Pathways
There are many types of nurse practitioner programs in the United States with the vast majority being in the specialty of a family nurse practitioner (FNP). There are also psychiatric, adult geriatric acute care, adult geriatric primary care, paediatric, cardiac, women’s health, oncology and neonatal nurse practitioner programmes. Many of these programs have their pre-clinical or didactic courses taught online with proctored examinations. Once the students start their clinical courses they have online material, but are required to perform clinical hours at an approved facility under the guidance of an NP or physician. Each clinical course has specific requirements that vary on their programme’s degree/eligibility for certification. For instance FNPs are required to see patients across the lifespan whereas Adult Geriatric NPs do not see anyone below the age of 13.
Quality of Care
A review of studies comparing outcomes of care by NPs and physicians in primary care and urgent care settings were generally comparable, although the strength of the evidence was generally low due to limited study duration and participant numbers. A recent study showed nurse practitioners practicing in states with independent prescription authority were more than twenty times more likely to overprescribe opioids than nurse practitioners in prescription-restricted states, the same study identified that both nurse practitioners and Physician Associates were more likely to over-prescribe opioids compared to physicians. Nurse practitioners and physician assistants were also associated with more unnecessary imaging services than primary care physicians, which may have ramifications on care and overall costs.
One systematic review suggests “that the implementation of advanced practice nursing roles in the emergency and critical care settings improves patient outcomes in emergency and critical care settings”.
Job Setting
Nurse practitioners are currently employed in a wide variety of practice settings. These settings include the ambulatory, inpatient, or emergency room of hospitals, health clinics, and office practices whether private or nurse-run. In addition, they serve in schools and college campuses delivering care as well as nursing homes and assisted living facilities. NPs can work alone or under the supervision of a physician in a wide variety of specialisations.
Scope of Practice
Australia
In Australia, a nurse practitioner-endorsed registered nurse has an expanded scope of practice, allowing them to practice certain advanced clinical skills within their endorsed field. As a nurse practitioner, they can complete advanced health assessments, diagnose and treat diseases, order diagnostic testing such as imaging and pathology, and prescribe medications and therapeutics. They are also able to register for a provider number with Medicare for the services they provide to patients, excluding services provided in public facilities (such as a Queensland Health hospital).
Nurse practitioner items on the Medicare Benefits Schedule, however, provide significantly smaller rebates than equivalent items for General Practitioners, leading to a higher out-of-pocket cost to patients. To claim Medicare rebates, the NP must also be in a documented “Collaborative Practice Arrangement” with a medical practitioner and the episode of care approved by a doctor. Prescriptions issued by NPs must also be verified by a medical practitioner to be eligible to be subsidised under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.
Canada
In Canada, an NP is a registered nurse (RN) with a graduate degree in nursing. Canada recognizes them in primary care and acute care practice. NPs diagnose illnesses and medical conditions, prescribe Schedule 1 medications, order and interpret diagnostic tests, and perform procedures, within their scope of practice, and may build their own panel of patients at the same level as physicians. Primary care NPs work in places like primary care and community healthcare centres, as well as long-term care institutions. The main focus of primary care NPs includes health promotion, preventative care, diagnosis and treatment of acute and chronic diseases and conditions. Acute care NPs serve a specific population of patients. They generally work in in-patient facilities that include neonatology, nephrology, and cardiology units. There are currently three specialties for nurse practitioners in Canada: family practice, paediatrics, and adult care. NPs who specialise in family practice work at the same level and offer the same services as family physicians with the exclusion of Quebec, where only physicians are allowed to formulate a medical diagnosis.
Ireland
Ireland’s publicly funded healthcare system, the Health Service Executive has the advanced nurse practitioner (ANP) grade. ANPs may prescribe medications.
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom nurse practitioners carry out care at an advanced practice level. They commonly work in primary care (e.g. GP surgeries) or A&E departments, although they are increasingly being seen in other areas of practice.
United States
Because the profession is state-regulated, the scope of practice varies by state. Some states allow NPs to have full practice authority, however, in other states, a written collaborative or supervisory agreement with a physician is legally required for practice. Autonomous practice was introduced in the 1980s, mostly in states facing a physician shortage or that struggled to find enough healthcare providers to work in rural areas. The extent of this collaborative agreement, and the role, duties, responsibilities, nursing treatments, and pharmacologic recommendations again varies widely between states.
NPs can legally examine patients, diagnose illness, prescribe some medications, and provide treatments. As of 2022, twenty-six states granted full practice authority to NPs and do not require the supervision or collaboration with a physician. Twenty-four states require NPs to have a written agreement with a physician in order to provide care. Eleven of those states require NPs to be supervised or delegated by a physician; this physician may not be on site.
Licensing and Board Certification
Australia
In Australia, nursing registration including endorsement of a RN as a nurse practitioner is overseen by the Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia (NMBA) and the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA). Registered nurses working in rural and isolated communities can apply for scheduled medicine prescriber endorsement if clinically necessary and trained, and instead become a prescribing registered nurse rather than a nurse practitioner to better meet the need of less-resourced communities. Nurse practitioners are professionally represented by the Australian College of Nurse Practitioners, as well as the Australian College of Nursing. Endorsement as a nurse practitioner in either Australia or New Zealand is recognised by both countries as part of the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Scheme.
For a RN to apply to the NMBA for nurse practitioner endorsement, they must be able to demonstrate they have completed at least 5000 hours (three years, full-time equivalent) at an “advanced nursing practice” level. Advanced nursing practice is loosely defined, and not a specific role, but rather a recognised process of higher-level clinical practice within a nurse’s existing scope of practice. The RN must also complete an approved nurse practitioner postgraduate master’s degree, or demonstrate they have gained qualifications to an equivalent level in advanced health assessment, pharmacology, therapeutics, diagnostics, and research. Nurses applying through the latter pathway must also demonstrate the equivalent training is clinically relevant to the field for which they wish to apply for nurse practitioner endorsement in.
Canada
In Canada, the educational standard is a graduate degree in nursing. The Canadian Nursing Association (CNA) notes that advanced practice nurses must have a combination of a graduate level education and the clinical experience that prepare them to practice at an advanced level. Their education alone does not give them the ability to practice at an advanced level. Two national frameworks have been developed in order to provide further guidance for the development of educational courses and requirements, research concepts, and government position statements regarding advanced practice nursing: the CNA’s Advanced Nursing Practice: A National Framework and the Canadian Nurse Practitioner Core Competency Framework. All educational programmes for NPs must achieve formal approval by provincial and territorial regulating nurse agencies due to the fact that the NP is considered a legislated role in Canada. As such, it is common to see differences among approved educational programs between territories and provinces. Specifically, inconsistencies can be found in core graduate courses, clinical experiences, and length of programs. Canada does not have a national curriculum or consistent standards regarding advanced practice nurses. All advanced practice nurses must meet individual requirements set by their provincial or territorial regulatory nursing body.
Israel
As of November 2013, NPs were recognised legally in Israel.
United States
The most common path to becoming a nurse practitioner in the US begins by earning a Bachelor of Science in Nursing (BSN) and passing the National Council Licensure Examination (NCLEX) to become an RN. One must then be accepted into and complete a Master of Science in Nursing (MSN) or Doctor of Nursing Practice (DNP) (most of which require at least 1-2 years of RN experience) to gain additional medical training in their specialty area. Finally, one must pass a national NP board certification exam.
Salary
The salary of an NP generally depends on the area of specialisation, location, years of experience, and level of education. In 2015, the American Association of Nurse Practitioners (AANP) conducted its fourth annual NP salary survey.[citation needed] The results revealed the salary range to be between $98,760 to $108,643 reported income among full-time NPs. According to the US Bureau of Labour Statistics, NPs in the top 10% earned an average salary of $135,800. The median salary was $98,190. According to a report published by Merritt Hawkins, starting salaries for NPs increased in dramatic fashion between 2015 and 2016. The highest average starting salary reached $197,000 in 2016. The primary factor in the dramatic increase in starting salaries is skyrocketing demand for NPs, recognising them as the fifth most highly sought after advanced health professional in 2016.
Policy during the COVID-19 Pandemic
The pandemic expanded the scope of practice for nurse practitioners in some countries as a result of temporary legislative policy adjustments. In the US, the Trump administration waived many requirements for nurse practitioners, permitting NPs to utilise their abilities to the fullest extent in some cases.
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In psychology, the positivity offset is a phenomenon where people tend to interpret neutral situations as mildly positive, and rate their lives as good, most of the time. The positivity offset stands in notable asymmetry to the negativity bias.
Similarities and Differences to Negativity Bias
Two studies were presented within a single study that looked at the difference between positivity offset and negative bias to see if it is good or bad for some people. The first study measured an individual’s reactions to different stimuli such as pictures, sounds, and words. The results from this study have also seen evidence, in comparison to other studies, that the positivity offset is in favour of positive stimuli over negative stimuli. The opposite effect is true for negative bias. An interesting observation that was made in this study was that positivity offset and negative bias was predicted in different behaviors rather than from established measures focused on personality. The second study sought to replicate the findings and compare those to the findings that have been found in other studies. The result of this study has also found evidence to suggest that positivity offset is preferred when the affective level input is not significant, whereas negative bias is favoured when the level of input is significant. One of the keys to understanding both the positivity offset and the negative bias is that the inputs of both are not meant to be separate, but both exist within the affective input level. The affective input level is a process to see what effect a certain stimulus has on an individual.
Two measures that have been used to look at the validity of both positivity offset and negative bias are based on judgement and personality. The measure of judgment focused on if there was a connection between locations of both spatial and affect. In other words, they measure to see if an individual understands what the stimulus is and how it affects them. The personality measure, on the other hand, speculates whether an individual defines a stimulus as being either positive or negative.
Positivity Offset and Negativity Bias in Depression
Regarding depression, there has been evidence to suggest that there is a connection between positivity offset and negative bias affecting the way that stimuli are perceived. The negative bias had a stronger influence than the positivity offset when the participants were depressed. For those who were healthy individuals, the results of both positivity offset, and negative bias were the same. This suggests that the positivity offset occurs when someone’s mind is considered to be healthy. The researchers go on to mention that their results regarding those individuals who were on the depressed side showed evidence that pleasing or neutral stimuli as being less positive compared to the results of the healthy individuals. The results of this study do show similarity to that of other studies in that positive emotions are not likely found in those who are in a depressed state. Those who are depressed may have an aversive side, but their motivational side to do things is not there. The concepts of both positivity offset and negative bias can also be analysed from an element of positive valence.
It is proposed that if this element is defined as being inactive, then there will be more assessments of stimuli that are perceived as being negative rather than as positive. While there may be more ratings with the negative stimuli, at the same time, assessments for positive stimuli of positive valence are hindered. This is the case even with stimuli that are in the middle that is perceived with positivity offset.
In Perception
Social neuroscience researcher John Cacioppo has assembled evidence that people typically see their surroundings as positive, whenever a clear threat is not present. Because of the positivity offset, people are motivated to explore and engage with their surroundings, instead of being balanced inactive between approach and avoidance.
In Life Satisfaction
Across most cultures, nations, and groups of people, the average and median ratings of life satisfaction are not neutral, as one might expect, but mildly positive.
Groups of people who do not show a positivity offset include people with depression, people in severe poverty, and people who live in perpetually threatening situations. However, many groups of people that outsiders would not expect to show the positivity offset do, such as people with paraplegia and spinal injury, very elderly people, and people with many chronic illnesses. In some cases these individuals never become as satisfied or happy with their lives as before their illness or injury, but over time (generally approximately two years), they still stabilise at a level substantially above neutral. That is, they judge themselves overall as satisfied or happy and not dissatisfied or unhappy.
Many of the major psychological publications on life satisfaction ratings have come from Ed Diener and colleagues. This empirical work gathered life-satisfaction judgements from many modern and traditional cultures worldwide.
This page is based on the copyrighted Wikipedia article < https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Positivity_offset >; it is used under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License (CC-BY-SA). You may redistribute it, verbatim or modified, providing that you comply with the terms of the CC-BY-SA.
The Shift-and-persist model has emerged in order to account for unintuitive, positive health outcomes in some individuals of low socioeconomic status.
A large body of research has previously linked low socioeconomic status to poor physical and mental health outcomes, including early mortality. Low socioeconomic status is hypothesized to get “under the skin” by producing chronic activation of the sympathetic nervous system and hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis, which increases allostatic load, leading to the pathogenesis of chronic disease. However, some individuals of low socioeconomic status do not appear to experience the expected, negative health effects associated with growing up in poverty. To account for this, the Shift-and-Persist Model proposes that, as children, some individuals of low socioeconomic status learn adaptive strategies for regulating their emotions (“shifting”) and focusing on their goals (“persisting”) in the face of chronic adversity. According to this model, the use of shift-and-persist strategies diminishes the typical negative effects of adversity on health by leading to more adaptive biological, cognitive, and behavioural responses to daily stressors.
Shift Strategies
Broadly, “shift” strategies encompass a variety of cognitive and emotion self-regulation approaches that individuals use to deal with stress, including cognitive restructuring, reframing, reappraisal, and acceptance strategies, which change the meaning of a stressor or reduce its emotional impact. These shift strategies particularly focus on changing one’s response to a stressor, instead of attempting to change the situation or stressor itself. As shift strategies depend more on internal processes (self-control and regulation), than external resources, it is hypothesized that shift strategies may be particularly adaptive responses to the chronic, uncontrollable stressors that are associated with low socioeconomic status.
Persist Strategies
According to Chen and Miller, “persist” strategies are any strategies that help individuals to maintain optimism about the future, create meaning from their experiences of challenge and hardship, and persist “with strength in the face of adversity.”
Measurement
To evaluate the combination of shift-and-persist strategy use, distinct “shift” and “persist” constructs were initially measured separately by using multiple, self-report measures of reappraisal, emotional reactivity, and future orientation in early research on this model.
In 2015, Chen and colleagues published the Shift-and-Persist Scale, which is a combined self-report measure that assesses both shift and persist strategies. The Shift-and-Persist Scale has been validated for use with adults and teenagers. The questionnaire asks respondents to rate how well 14 statements about various approaches to dealing with life stressors apply to them on a 1-4 scale. Out of the 14 items on the measure, 4 assess a respondent’s use of shift strategies, 4 load onto persist strategies, and 6 items are non-relevant distractors that are ignored during scoring. When scoring the Shift-and-Persist Scale, one item (#4) is reverse-scored. This scale is publicly available online.
A simplified 5-item Shift-and-Persist scale has also been published for use with younger children and adolescents (ages 9–15). Total scores on this version of the Shift-and-Persist Scale range from 0-20, such that higher scores are indicative of greater use of shift-and-persist strategies. This scale is also publicly available online and has been previously used in research with children from kindergarten through 8th grade.
Proposed Mechanisms
Reduction of the Harmful Biological Effects of Stress
The shift-and-persist model mainly hypothesizes that these strategies have protective effects for the health of low socioeconomic status individuals because they affect biological and physiological stress response tendencies that are relevant for disease. There is some evidence that shift responses (e.g. reappraisal) to acute stressors are associated with attenuated physiological responses to stress, including reduced cardiovascular reactivity. Specifically, reappraisal has been linked to a “healthier” pattern of hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis response characterised by a rapid return to homeostasis (i.e., faster cortisol recovery) in the wake of a stressor. Persist tendencies, such as optimism, have also been associated with adaptive immune responses and faster cortisol recovery. By constraining the magnitude and duration of biological stress responses, including cardiovascular, hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis, and inflammatory responses to stress, shift-and-persist responses are hypothesized to prevent the wear and tear on these systems that increases allostatic load and risk for chronic diseases of aging.
Cross-sectional studies provide some evidence that greater emotion regulation abilities are associated with reduced health risk on a variety of indicators of allostatic load. Similarly, self-reported trait levels of optimism and purpose in life have been linked to better concurrent health and health trajectories over time. However, most of the health benefits associated with shift-and-persist consistent strategies are only seen in low socioeconomic status samples.
Enhancement of Adaptive Biological Stress-Recovery Systems
Another alternative, but not mutually exclusive hypothesis, is that shift-and-persist strategies affect health by increasing or up-regulating biological responses that enhance stress recovery and resilience. In particular, the parasympathetic nervous system’s functioning may be enhanced by shift-and-persist response tendencies. Emotion regulation abilities that are consistent with shift-coping have been linked to greater parasympathetic nervous system functioning at rest, as indexed by higher levels of high-frequency heart rate variability. Further, the parasympathetic nervous system is highly integrated with, and may contribute to the down-regulation of hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis and immune system stress responses that influence allostatic load over time. Although parasympathetic nervous system activity is correlated with aspects of shift-and-persist coping, it is not yet established that the use of these strategies actually increases parasympathetic nervous system activity.
The oxytocin system has also been identified as another potential mechanism by which shift-and-persist strategies could influence health outcomes. Oxytocin is a hormone that has been linked to a wide range of positive social and emotional functions and can be used to effectively attenuate hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis and sympathetic nervous system responses to stress. However, there is little research examining the interplay between shift-and-persist strategy use and the oxytocin system.
Impact on Health Behaviours
It has also been proposed that shift-and-persist strategies may buffer health outcomes in individuals of low socioeconomic status by affecting health behaviours. Previous research has demonstrated that, regardless of socioeconomic status, individuals with emotion regulation difficulties are also likely to engage in poorer health behaviours, including over-eating, sedentary lifestyle, risky sexual health behaviours, and drug use. Individuals of low socioeconomic status who learn to regulate their emotions more effectively, by using “shift” strategies in childhood, may be more likely than their peers with emotion regulation difficulties to establish and sustain positive health behaviours throughout development. Similarly, persist strategies that help individuals to maintain a positive focus on the future may also affect wellbeing through health behaviours. Prior studies have linked being “future-oriented” to lower levels of drug use and sexual risk behaviours. Therefore, it is possible that individuals who regularly use shift-and-persist strategies will be more likely to practice positive health behaviours, which promote healthy development and aging.
However, it is important to note that the relationships between emotion regulation abilities and health behaviour are bidirectional. Health behaviours, such as physical activity and sleep hygiene, can also have powerful effects on our capacity to successfully regulate emotions.
Research Support for Associations with Health
Since 2012, integrative research groups concerned with clinical health psychology, social psychology, psychoneuroimmunology, and public health have begun to evaluate the relationships postulated by the shift-and-persist model. The majority of empirical studies on this topic test whether shift-and-persist strategies are associated with differential health outcomes in low vs. high socioeconomic status samples.
Thus far, high levels of shift-and-persist strategy use have been linked to:
Lower total allostatic load in adults who grew up in low, but not high, socioeconomic status households.
Lower body mass index in children from low, but not high, socioeconomic status families.
Reduced low-grade inflammation in adolescents (and parents) from low socioeconomic status families.
A “healthier” profile of hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis functioning, as indexed by diurnal cortisol in children from low socioeconomic status families.
Lower levels of asthma-related impairment and inflammation in children from low, but not high, socioeconomic status families.
Better asthma profiles in children and teens from families reporting low, but not high, perceived social status.
Lower levels of depressive symptoms in Latinx youth from low, but not high, income families.
Although it has been proposed that a variety of psychological interventions for at-risk youth of low socioeconomic status may reduce health disparities, in part, by increasing shift-and-persist tendencies in families, the majority of studies on shift-and-persist have been cross-sectional. Therefore, it remains unknown if shift-and-persist strategies play a causal role in reducing the negative impact of low socioeconomic status on health. More longitudinal and treatment studies are needed to evaluate directional and causal hypotheses based upon the shift-and-persist model.
This page is based on the copyrighted Wikipedia article < https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shift-and-persist_model >; it is used under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License (CC-BY-SA). You may redistribute it, verbatim or modified, providing that you comply with the terms of the CC-BY-SA.
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